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This study examines the policies adopted by flag and port states to govern the use of armed 
guards on board merchant vessels.  The International Maritime Organisation and a number of 
member states’ responses to the use of armed guards on board ships are discussed. The focus of 
this study is the South African policy on privately contracted armed security personnel intending 
to embark or disembark in a South African port with arms and ammunition.  The question of 
whether South Africa allows armed guards in its territory is addressed, as well as the 
requirements and conditions attached to such permission.  The dissertation concludes by 
recommending that the Regulations to the South African Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 should 
be amended in order to give effect to and streamline the permit process for foreign security 
firms. 
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BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The resurgence of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa (namely, Somalia) recorded during 2006 
affected world trade.1 Shipowners were left defenceless against Somali pirates and were caught 
completely off guard.  Stakeholders therefore sought the best means to protect merchant vessels, 
ranging from naval escorts, to vessel perimeter protection measures and citadels; however, the 
deployment of armed guards has caused the greatest controversy in the industry.  This study 
examines the international guidelines on the use of privately contracted armed security 
personnel, and flag states, shipowners and coastal states’ response, focusing on the difficulties 
faced by security firms in embarking or disembarking armed personnel in South African ports.  
The Gulf of Aden is arguably the busiest shipping lane in the world connecting Europe and the 
West with Asia.  It is reported that there were 237 actual and attempted attacks and 28 successful 
hijackings in 2011,2 whilst there were 75 attacks and 14 successful hijackings of merchant 
vessels off the coast of Somalia, Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean in 2012.  In 2013, 15 
attacks and two hijackings of vessels off Somalia were recorded, the lowest since 2006.3 It is 
estimated that Somali piracy costs the world economy around $6 billion annually4 with some 
scholars setting the figure higher at between $7 billion and $12 billion per year.5  In addition to 
the actual costs, considerable potential costs may be incurred.  For example, some scholars are of 
                                                          
1 ICC International Maritime Bureau ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report for the period 1 
January 2006 – 31 December 2006’.  Available on request at www.ics-ccs.org. 
Neethling, Theo ‘Piracy around Africa’s West and East coasts: A comparative political perspective’ (2010) 38 (2) 
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies at 91. 
Minister L. N. Sisulu ‘Address at the SADC Extraordinary meeting on Regional Anti-Piracy strategy’ (25 July 
2011) at 7.  Available at http://www.dod.mil.za/speeches/July2011/anti-piracy%20strategy%20.pdf accessed on 18 
August 2014. 
2 ICC International Maritime Bureau ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report for the period 1 
January 2013 – 31 December 2013’, page 24.  Available on request at www.icc-ccs.org.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Oceans Beyond Piracy ‘The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012’ available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/economic-cost-piracy-2012 accessed on 8 November 2013. 
5 Henri Fouché ‘Staggering global economic and human cost of maritime piracy on the eastern seaboard of Africa’ 
(2011) 24(3) Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology at i. 
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the view that piracy off the East and West coast of Africa has the potential to cause catastrophic 
environmental incidents which littoral states are not equipped to deal with.6  
The international community responded to the increase in sea piracy by deploying naval vessels 
in the area.  Best management practices were also developed for the industry to adopt accepted 
standards to prevent and/or deter attacks and ensure open lines of communication and 
information sharing between countries. 
Pirate attacks increased between 2006 and 20107 and vessels and crews were being held to 
ransom despite the military response from various states.  Vessel owners were forced to arrange 
ransom payments in order to get their vessels and crew released.  It is estimated that the average 
ransom payment is in the sum of US$2.7 million per vessel (calculated during the period 2005 to 
2012) with total payments of approximately US$413 million.8  These statistics show that the 
presence of naval forces in the Indian ocean did not deter Somali pirates9 as they started 
operating from ‘mother-ships’ able to deploy skiffs to attack a nearby vessel10 far in the Indian 
Ocean to avoid the naval patrols.11  The pirates obtained global positioning systems to track 
vessels and were well organised, with high powered outboard motors, fully automatic weapons, 
                                                          
6 Herbig & Fouché ‘Maritime piracy and conservation crime in Africa:  Has the die been cast for an environmental 
disaster?’ (2013) 26(1) Acta Criminologica:  Southern African Journal of Criminology at 39-41.  
7 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) ‘Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships – Annual 
report – 2010’ (1 April 2011) MSC.4/Circ.169 at Annex 4 - available at 
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/Statisticalresources/Piracy/Pages/Piracy-
reports-(annual)-1996-2012.aspx accessed on 4 April 2014. 
8 Christopher Harress ‘Secret Flow of Somali Piracy Ransoms: 179 Hijacked ships Generated some $400M in 
Payments since 2005.  So where has it all gone?’ (4 November 2012) available at http://www.ibtimes.com/secret-
flow-somali-piracy-ransoms-179-hijacked-ships-generated-some-400m-payments-2005-so-where-has accessed on 9 
November 2013. 
9 Jeffrey Gettleman ‘Naval patrols fail to deter pirates’ (17 December 2008) – World Security Network available at 
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Terrorism/Gettleman-Jeffrey/Naval-patrols-fail-to-deter-pirates accessed on 
22 November 2013. 
10 Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, Version 4 – August 2011 (BMP4) - 
IMO Resolution MSC.324(89) on ‘Implementation of Best Management Practice Guidance by the publication:  IMO 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia’ – MSC.1/Circ. 1339, Section 4 at page 
9. 
H Fouché ‘Policing Maritime Piracy in Southern Africa’ (2006) 19 (3) Acta Criminologica: Southern African 
Journal of Criminology 184. 
11 Henri Fouché ‘Somali pirates take to the high seas: Expediency or long-term pirate strategy’ (2009) 37 (2) 




rocket-propelled grenades and hook ladders to enable them to board vessels.12  This left vessel 
owners with little choice but to deploy armed guards to protect the ship, cargo and crew. 
During the second half of 2010, private maritime security companies (PMSC) began offering 
armed protection services to vessel owners as a means of defence against acts of sea piracy.  
Security teams, mostly comprised of former British and American marines, were placed on board 
vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.13  One of the most effective means of 
preventing a pirate attack “is to secure the vessels themselves”.14 
The deployment of armed guards on merchant vessels was not without controversy; various 
arguments for and against this strategy were made by owners, protection and indemnity clubs 
(P&I Clubs), governmental organisations and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).  It 
should be noted that the use of armed guards was not recommended in the Best Management 
Practice version 2.15  
The use of weapons on board vessels to deter piracy was given “[a] boost on 15 February 2011 
when the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) announced a change of stance on armed 
guards, recognising that they were being used off Somalia.”16 Prior to this, the German and 
British Governments were firmly against the placement of privately contracted armed security 
personnel (PCASP) on board vessels flying their flags; this changed once their respective 
legislatures reviewed their national policies.17 
                                                          
12 Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, Version 4 – August 2011 (BMP4) - 
IMO Resolution MSC.324(89) on ‘Implementation of Best Management Practice Guidance by the publication:  IMO 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia’ – MSC.1/Circ. 1339, Sections 4.3 and 
4.4 at page 10. 
13 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas:  A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law at 117. 
14 Douglas Guilfoyle ‘Somali Pirates as Agents of Change in International Law – making and Organisation’ (2012) 1 
(3) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law at 101. 
15 Section 2(b)(vii): Best Management Practices to deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia, 
Version 2 – August 2009 – IMO ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Water off the Coast of Somalia’ - 
MSC.1/Circ. 1332 (16 June 2009)available at http://www.nee.gr/downloads/26BMP.pdf accessed on 4 December 
2013. 
16 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy:  Issues arising from the use of armed guards’, Ince & Co Publication 2011 available at 
http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-arising-from-
the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
17 Ibid.   
See also Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas:  A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of 




The ICS chairman stated that: 
ICS has had to acknowledge that the decision to engage armed guards, whether military or 
private, is a decision to be made by the ship operator after due consideration of all of the risks, 
and subject to the approval of the vessel’s flag state and insurers. The consensus view amongst 
shipping industry associations remains that, in normal circumstances, private armed guards are 
not recommended, and are a clear second best to military personnel.18 
Numerous issues arose, including the assertion that the use of armed guards “could result in 
escalation of the use of force”19  Vessel owners needed to balance this with the substantial 
decrease in the risk of their vessels being highjacked if such measures were taken.   
Stakeholders in the private maritime security industry use the selling point that, “to date, no ship 
has been successfully taken by Somali pirates with a PCASP team on board”.20  Some scholars 
argue that “armed private contractors present a fiscally sound solution to the problem of piracy 
for shipowners” in comparison to the cost of increased war risk premiums and additional fuel to 
divert vessels from dangerous waters.21  It is thus difficult for shipowners to justify not deploying 
armed guards on a vessel when confronted with a 100 per cent success rate in deterring pirate 
attacks and the economic benefits.  Abeyratne argues that ship owners may face potential 
liability if armed guards are not used on their vessels as they “may not have an excuse for not 
                                                          
18 International Chamber of Shipping ‘Shipping Industry Changes Stance on Armed Guards’ (15 February 2011) 
available at http://wwww.ics-shipping.org/2011.htm#15feb  accessed on 9 November 2013. 
19 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy:  Issues arising from the use of armed guards’, Ince & Co Publication 2011 available at 
http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-arising-from-
the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
20 Sailor’s Society ‘Piracy Update: Armed Guards, West African Hi-jackings and Guardcon revisited’ (31 October 
2013) available at http://saiss.co.za/piracy/piracy-update-armed-guards-west-african-hijackings-and-guardcon-
revisited/ accessed on 9 November 2013. 
John Stupart ‘Private Military Contractors in Somalia’ (July, 2013) Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor, Consultancy 
Africa Intelligence (Pty) Ltd at 39. 
21 Sean Patrick Mahard ‘Blackwater’s New Battlefield:  Toward a Regulatory Regime in the United States for 
Privately Armed Contractors at Sea’ (2014) 47(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law at 341. 
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carrying armed guards in the ships in the face of such flexibility and ... not making use of 
applicable legislation”.22 
It is reported that up to 28 per cent of all ships transiting the Indian Ocean are carrying armed 
guards at an annual cost of USD530 million23 to vessel owners.  The private maritime security 
industry is expanding rapidly “especially because of their deterrence success rate to date and the 
consequential increasing number of states which have sanctioned or licensed such armed agents 
on their ships”.24  This study discusses the measures and policies adopted by the IMO and 
member states to protect a vital trade route and, in particular, the response to the armed self 
defence mechanism implemented by shipowners to protect their vessels from pirate attacks, 
namely, privately contracted armed security guards (PCASP).   
1.2 Objectives of the research 
The objectives of the research are to determine whether there are international policies that 
regulate the use of PCASP on board merchant ships and, in particular, if there are obligations on 
coastal states to facilitate the movement of these personnel with specific reference to South 
Africa.  The study investigates the issues raised by the shipping industry regarding the use of 
armed guards and how these issues have been addressed or settled through the IMO guidelines 
and recommendations. This includes a comparative analysis of the position of four flag states, 
including the largest vessel registry in the world, Panama, regarding PCASP on board vessels 
flying their flags as well as the policies adopted by Egypt, a coastal state in Africa which has 
jurisdiction over the Suez Canal, the sea lane leading to or from the Gulf of Aden and nearby 
coastal states. 
                                                          
22 Ruwantissa Abeyratne ‘The use of armed guards on board merchant vessels’ (2012) 5 Journal of Transportation 
Security at 167 available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12198-012-0088-5# accessed on 13 March 
2014. 
23 Project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, ‘Small Arms Survey 2012: 




ng%20guards&f=false accessed on 9 November 2013. 
24 Clive R. Symmons ‘Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial 
Vessels:  International Legal Consequences and Problems under the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 51/1 Military Law and 
the Law of War Review at 28. 
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The primary objectives of this research study are to determine, firstly, what South African laws 
or policies govern the permitting, movement and storage of weapons on board merchant vessels 
entering South African ports; and, secondly, whether these laws effectively facilitate these 
activities within the ambit of the international recommendations and guidelines to coastal states 
on the use of PCASP on board merchant vessels to combat sea piracy.   
1.3 Key research questions 
The following key research questions are addressed: 
1. What international legal instruments regulate the use of PCASP on board merchant 
vessels? 
2. What policies have been adopted by flag states as well as coastal states with jurisdiction 
near the Gulf of Aden relating to armed guards on merchant vessels? 
3. Does South Africa allow firearms to be brought into its territory on board merchant 
vessels? 
4. What is the process involved in obtaining the necessary permission/documentation? 
5. What conditions are attached to such permission? 
6. Does South African legislation specifically cater for armed guards on board merchant 
vessels entering its ports? 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
The researcher conducted desktop research, relying on primary and secondary sources.  The 
researcher did not find it necessary to conduct interviews as the primary resources available in 
the form, for example, of South African court case pleadings and annexures was deemed 
sufficient for the purpose of this study in that they provided concrete examples of how the South 





International conventions governing the law of the sea, maritime terrorism and security and 
safety of life at sea were reviewed as such international law binds states which are parties 
thereto.  The researcher obtained a list of the countries that ratified the international conventions 
from the United Nations’ (UN) online treaty collection. The guidelines, recommendations, best 
management practices and reports published online by the IMO whose website is available to the 
public, were analysed.  The IMO is tasked with creating regulatory frameworks to ensure the 
safety and security of shipping on the world’s oceans. While non-mandatory, these provide legal 
frameworks within which member states can develop their domestic policies or legislation, 
which should be intrinsically similar to the objectives set out in the documents.  The researcher 
set out to establish whether coastal member states completed the IMO questionnaire on their 
domestic policies.   
Furthermore, the legislation, official published guidelines and circulars of four flag states, 
including Panama, the country with the largest vessel registry in the world, were compared in 
order to determine what their policies on armed guards are, and whether there are differences or 
similarities with the IMO recommendations and guidelines to flag states. 
Egypt’s official circulars on the use of armed guards in its territory were also analysed as Egypt 
is a coastal state with jurisdiction over the Suez Canal, with access to and from the Gulf of Aden.  
Academic commentary on, and response to, the IMO questionnaire on the policies of other states 
with jurisdiction near the Gulf of Aden was also analysed. 
The research included an analysis of statistics on vessels recorded in states’ registries from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) - an international 
organisation tasked with the development of international trade and publishing figures relating 
to, amongst others, shipping. 
The research also included a review of South African legislation regulating the importation of 
firearms and ammunition into South African territory including the Firearms Control Act25 
(FCA), National Conventional Arms Control Act26 (NCACA) and Customs and Excise Act27 
                                                          
25 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
26 The National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002, as amended. 
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(C&E Act). The researcher presents a detailed analysis of the FCA and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder.  Matters falling outside the ambit of the FCA, and governed by the 
NCACA and C&E Act, fall outside the scope of the study and are thus not discussed in detail. 
The focus of the analysis was the legislative provisions relevant to the entry of weapons into 
South African ports on board merchant vessels deploying PCASP to combat sea piracy. 
This required the researcher to determine whether any directives or communication relating to 
PCASP on board merchant vessels have emanated from the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), which is tasked with enforcement and implementation of the FCA and regulations in the 
Republic of South Africa.  These communications are attached in annexure B.28  Much weight 
was placed on these communications to highlight the issues addressed in this study. 
 
Secondary sources 
The researcher conducted an extensive review of journal articles through the use of websites and 
the global literature on the issues addressed in this study.  The placement of armed guards on 
vessels in response to maritime piracy is a new phenomenon and is thus a fresh topic for 
discussion and opinions. The researcher conducted a comprehensive survey of the literature by 
South African and African authors and academics. Whilst some studies have been conducted on 
piracy along the African coastline exist,29 and others make passing reference to armed guards 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended. 
28 Items 1 to 4 of annexure B, and the information about the unreported South African legal cases presented in 
Chapter 4 were obtained from the court documents on public record in the Durban High Court, which include 
reference to the full pleadings and annexures as well as the judgments. 
29 H Fouché ‘Policing Maritime Piracy in Southern Africa’ (2006) 19 (3) Acta Criminologica: Southern African 
Journal of Criminology 180-194.  B.P.O. Mokoena ‘Report from the Workshop on Maritime Policing to Combat 
Maritime Crime’ (2013) 2(3&4) Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS) at 35.  Neethling, Theo ‘Piracy around 
Africa’s West and East coasts:  A comparative political perspective’ (2010) 38 (2) Scientia Militaria: South African 
Journal of Military Studies at 89-108.  Thean Potgieter ‘The Maritime Security Quandary in the Horn of Africa 
Region:  Causes, Consequences and Responses’ (January, 2008) East African Human Security Forum Discussion 
Paper; Hanns Seidel Foundation Kenya.  Available at 
http://www.grid.unep.ch/FP2011/step1/pdf/005_Potgieter_2009.pdf accessed on 20 August 2014.  Potgieter, T ‘The 
lack of maritime security in the Horn of Africa:  Scope and effect’ (2009) xxxi(1) Strategic Review for Southern 
Africa 66.  Freedom C Onuoha ‘Sea piracy and maritime security in the Horn of Africa:  The Somali coast and Gulf 
of Aden in perspective’ (2009) 18(3) African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies 31-44. 
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deployed on board merchant vessels,30 no study has been conducted to date that specifically 
addresses the issue of permitting and controlling the movement of weapons and PCASP in South 
African ports and analysing the FCA and regulations. 
The researcher relied on various internet sources, including articles by maritime law practitioners 
and P&I Clubs and online news articles.  A number of facts and figures are provided in online 
news articles relating to the use of PCASP on merchant vessels.  The purpose of using such 
sources is to understand the latest developments in the use of armed guards in flag and port 
states.   
1.5 Detailed chapter breakdown 
This first chapter introduces the study topic and provides the background to the research, namely, 
the international response to the use of armed guards on board merchant vessels as a means of 
defence against Somali piracy.  The study’s objectives are discussed with reference to the key 
research questions that will be addressed in subsequent chapters, and the research methodology 
is explained.  Chapter Two discusses the international recommendations and regulations 
governing the deployment of PCASP, focusing on the IMO recommendations to coastal and port 
states.  Chapter Three briefly discusses the laws of a number of foreign states and regulations 
relating to armed guards on board merchant vessels.  
The crux of the study is Chapter Four where South African law and policy governing permits for 
weapons brought into South Africa’s ports on board merchant vessels deploying PCASP is 
discussed.  Shortcomings in the current Firearms Controls Act, 60 of 2000 and regulations 
promulgated thereunder, are analysed in detail, followed by an analysis of recent cases heard in 
the Durban High Court where these provisions were applied to disputes arising in relation to the 
firearms permit requirements applicable to PCASP and vessel owners intending to call at a South 
African port.  The chapter discusses security concerns relating to armed guards as well as the 
                                                          
30 Henri Fouché ‘Somali pirates take to the high seas:  Expediency or long-term pirate strategy’ (2009) 37 (2) 
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 67-81.  John Stupart ‘Private Military Contractors in 
Somalia’ (July, 2013) Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor, Consultancy Africa Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 39-42.  Freedom 
C Onuoha ‘Sea piracy and maritime security in the Horn of Africa:  The Somali coast and Gulf of Aden in 
perspective’ (2009) 18(3) African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies 31-44.  Potgieter, TD ‘Maritime 
Security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features’ (August, 2012) 236 Institute for Security Studies Paper 
1-21.  B.P.O. Mokoena ‘Report from the Workshop on Maritime Policing to Combat Maritime Crime’ (2013) 
2(3&4) Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS) at 35. 
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permit application process and requirements in South Africa which can potentially hinder the 
operation of merchant vessels intending to call at South African ports with PCASP and weapons 
on board. 
Chapter Five concludes the study. It presents the findings in relation to each of the key research 
questions and recommends specific amendments to South African firearms legislation in order to 







The definition of piracy in terms of international law is set out in Article 101 of the United 
Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):31 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a)  Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii)  against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State; 
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or 
(b). 
 
In terms of where the act takes place, provided that attacks on merchant vessels are on the high 
seas and not in a member state’s territorial waters, the modus operandi and actions of the Somali 
pirates would fall within this definition.  Member states have an obligation to repress piracy and 
“shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent”32 in achieving this.  It should be noted, however, 
that there are no express provisions in UNCLOS on preventative measures that may or may not 
be used to deter pirate attacks.  Member states are entitled to seize a pirate ship (as defined) and 
arrest persons found on board notwithstanding same being on the high seas.33 
Should a vessel be hijacked within the territorial waters of a state, this act would fall within the 
ambit of Article 3 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
                                                          
31 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, New York: United Nations. 
32 Ibid, Art 100.  
33 Ibid Art. 105 read with Art. 107. 
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Maritime Navigation (SUA)34 and, when article 3 is incorporated into the national legislation of 
a state party to the convention, these unlawful acts are deemed punishable.35  The SUA also does 
not contain provisions regarding the prevention of piracy within a state’s territorial waters and 
EEZ or on the use of PCASP.  
Article 3 of the SUA states that: 
 1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally; 
(a) Seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation ...  
Although the SUA and scholars recognise that piracy occurs in the territorial waters and EEZ of 
member states, and not only on the high seas as defined in UNCLOS,36 reliance on the 
prosecution of pirates is not sufficient to deter attacks.  If PCASP disembark when vessels are in 
coastal waters this leaves the vessel vulnerable to piracy, particularly in Gulf of Aden littoral 
states.  The mv “Fairchem Bogey” was hijacked by suspected Somali pirates on 21 August 2011 
whilst she was anchored off the coast of Oman.  The incident took place shortly after a PCASP 
team disembarked from the vessel subsequent to completing a transit through the Gulf of Aden 
as was normal procedure.  The question needs to be asked; would the hijacking have been 
successful if the armed guards were on board the vessel whilst anchored in Oman’s territory?  
Statistics show that to date no vessel has been hijacked with an armed team on board.  Although 
PCASP were becoming a popular and effective deterrent against pirate attacks there was a lacuna 
in the existing international law as it did not regulate the use of same on board merchant vessels 
plying their trade in the world’s oceans. 
                                                          
34 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted on 10 
March 1988, entered into force on 1 March 1992; Rome: United Nations (SUA). 
35 Article 5 of SUA makes it obligatory for member states to make the offences listed in Article 3 punishable in 
terms of their national legislation.  Art.5 reads:  
Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 3 punishable by appropriate penalties which 
take into account the grave nature of those offences. 
36 H Fouché ‘Policing Maritime Piracy in Southern Africa’ (2006) 19 (3) Acta Criminologica: Southern African 
Journal of Criminology at 188, is of the view that UNCLOS is “clearly in need of revision to make provision for the 
geographical location of incidents of piracy in the 21st century”. 
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The IMO37 aims to ensure the “general adoption of the highest technical standards concerning 
maritime safety and efficiency; prevent discriminatory practices that may restrict international 
trade and promote the exchange of information of any shipping matters among member state 
Governments”.38  The IMO has various committees made up of experts in their fields including 
maritime trade, law and security.  The function of the IMO is “consultative and advisory”.39  The 
IMO Convention established three main organs, the Assembly, Council and the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC).40 
The MSC considers “aids to navigation, construction and equipment of vessels, manning from a 
safety standpoint, rules for the prevention of collisions, handling of dangerous cargoes, maritime 
safety procedures and requirements, marine casualty investigation and any other matters directly 
affecting maritime safety”.41  Member States, Non-Governmental Organisations and associations 
request assistance from the IMO with particular issues that affect the interests of their state 
and/or organisation.  The Republic of South Africa is a member of the IMO and acceded to the 
IMO convention in 1995.42  The IMO plays a proactive role in developing guidelines for member 
states on issues that arise in the maritime industry which require consistent rules and regulations 
due to the international nature of maritime trade.  The laws governing maritime trade need to be 
consistent as trans-ocean movement of vessels involves a wide variety of jurisdictions and ship 
owners should systematically comply with obligations rather than on an ad hoc basis for each 
country the vessel will transit. 
Responses to the piratical attacks between 2008 and 2013 resulted in the IMO publishing 
guidelines to assist member states to regulate the private maritime security industry.  The IMO is 
often called on to act swiftly to new circumstances that affect the shipping industry. 
                                                          
37 The IMO was created by the Convention on InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization E/Conf4.61 
on 16 March 1948; London (IMCO Convention) and the name was later changed to International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the IMO Convention). 
38 Article 1 of the IMCO Convention. 
39 Article 2 of the IMCO Convention. 
40 The IMCO Convention in Article 12 states that the Organization will comprise of “an Assembly, a Council and a 
Maritime Safety Committee. 
41 Article 29 of the Convention on the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization E/Conf4.61 on 16 
March 1948 (“IMCO Convention”). 
42 United Nations Treaty Collection available at 




The IMO through the MSC heeded the call from the UN Security Council - which encourages 
the development of regulations for the use of PCASP43 - for shipowners, flag states, coastal and 
port member states as well as PMSC to address the complex issue of placing PCASP on board 
merchant vessels as a means of protection against piratical attacks in the Indian Ocean and Gulf 
of Aden.  The MSC convened an intercessional meeting of the “Maritime Security and Piracy 
Working Group” to develop such guidelines44.  The interim guidelines for shipowners45 and 
interim recommendations for flag states46 were published simultaneously on 23 May 2011. 
In answering this study’s first research question, the researcher discusses the main provisions of 
the IMO guidelines and recommendations on armed guards in relation to the following issues 
highlighted by industry experts47: 
1. The problem of a divided command – who would ultimately be in charge on board the 
vessel if a security team were to engage an approaching pirate skiff in the middle of the 
Indian Ocean? 
                                                          
43 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) adopted at its 5902nd meeting on 2 June 2008; New 
York: United Nations at para. 4 and 5: 
4. Further urges States to work in cooperation with interested organizations, including the IMO, to ensure that 
vessels entitled to fly their flag receive appropriate guidance and training on avoidance, evasion, and 
defensive techniques and to avoid the area whenever possible;  
5. Calls upon States and interested organizations, including the IMO, to provide technical assistance to 
Somalia and nearby coastal States upon their request to enhance the capacity of these States to ensure 
coastal and maritime security, including combating piracy and armed robbery off the Somali and nearby 
coastlines. 
See with particular reference to PCASP: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2125 (2013) adopted at its 
7061st meeting on 18 November 2013; New York: United Nations at para 3 and para. 26: 
3. Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the 
High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security 
personnel (PCASP), and encouraging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable 
international law and permit charters to favour arrangements that make use of such measures, 
26. Encourages flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures 
on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, 
aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, 
including through the IMO and ISO. 
44At the MSC’s 89th session from 11 – 20 May 2011. 
45 IMO Interim Guidance to shipowners, ship operators, and shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed 
security personnel on board ships in the high risk area.  MSC.1/Circ. 1405. Rev. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 
Guidance to Shipowners). 
46IMO Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on board ships in the high risk area.  MSC.1/Circ. 1406. Rev.1 (hereinafter referred to as Guidelines to 
Flag States). 
47 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy:  Issues arising from the use of armed guards’, Ince & Co Publication 2011 available at 
http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-arising-from-
the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
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2. When would a security team be entitled to use lethal force and what are the rules 
governing the use of force? 
3. Who needs to be notified of the presence of PCASP on board a vessel? 
4. What criteria should be used for a risk assessment of a PMSC? 
5. How will the export and import of weapons be controlled in coastal states’ ports, and how 
is the licensing of such weapons by PMSC to be controlled? 
Concerted effort is required to ensure consistent, coherent and codified requirements in order to 
ensure that international maritime trade is not unduly disrupted and that the interests of a port 
state’s security are not compromised. 
 
2.2 IMO Guidance to Shipowners 
The Guidance to Shipowners48 was drafted in response to the “extended use of armed guards and 
marked expansion in the number of firms offering armed maritime security services for vessels 
transiting the HRA49”.  For the purpose of this study, revision 2,50 which was published on 25 
May 2012, is discussed as it revoked revision 1.51  The IMO expressly acknowledged the rapid 
growth of PMSC firms offering protection against piracy and sought to provide guidance to the 
international maritime community on their use. 
                                                          
48IMO Interim Guidance to shipowners, ship operators, and shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed 
security personnel on board ships in the high risk area.  MSC.1/Circ. 1401. Rev. 1 - introduction paragraph 1. 
49 HRA stands for the “High Risk Area” as defined in Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia 
Based Piracy, Version 4 – August 2011 (BMP4) - IMO Resolution MSC.324(89) on ‘Implementation of Best 
Management Practice Guidance by the publication:  IMO Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the 
Coast of Somalia’ – MSC.1/Circ. 1339 as:  
Section 2.4: “an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10`S and 78`E”. 
50 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2. 
51 Ibid para. 9. 
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The urgent need to address the issue of PCASP is highlighted in the circular and reference is 
made to Guidance to Flag States and the MSC FAL Questionnaire,52 which should be read in 
conjunction with the Guidance to Shipowners.53 
The IMO did not officially endorse the use of PCASP,54 but stated that the Guidance to 
Shipowners was drafted on the “understanding that shipping companies may find it difficult to 
identify reliable, professional private providers of armed security”.55 The intention is to provide 
guidance to shipowners who decide to use PCASP to protect their crews, cargo and vessels from 
pirate attacks by striking a balance between protecting international trade routes and the security 
of coastal states, crews and persons plying their trade on the open seas.  The IMO “have taken 
the lead in laying down international guidelines for [private armed security guards] PASGs at 
least; and States seem already to be adopting such international standard-setting rules into their 
domestic rules”.56  The IMO states that Best Management Practice57 (BMP) should be 
implemented in conjunction with the use of PCASP after a thorough risk assessment has been 
carried out by shipowners – not the alternative.58  BMP refers to “(passive and non-lethal) 
measures vessels should take to protect themselves from a pirate attack… making it a kind of 
industry-policed soft-law”.59 
BMP will be referred to intermittently as most, if not all, P&I Clubs insist on strict compliance 
with same.60  It is thus important that shipowners adhere to the provisions of BMP and 
                                                          
52 IMO Questionnaire on Information on Port and Coastal State Requirements Related to Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships, MSC-FAL. 1/Circ.2 - 22 September 2011. 
53 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, para. 2/5. 
54 Ibid para. 1.1. 
55 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2. 
56 Clive R. Symmons ‘Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial 
Vessels:  International Legal Consequences and Problems under the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 51/1 Military Law and 
the Law of War Review at 27. 
57 Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, Version 4 – August 2011 (BMP4) - 
IMO Resolution MSC.324(89) on ‘Implementation of Best Management Practice Guidance by the publication:  IMO 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia’ – MSC.1/Circ. 1339.  This revoked 
MSC.1/Circ.1337, namely version 3 of BMP.   
58 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 at Annex para. 
1.5. 
59 Douglas Guilfoyle ‘Somali Pirates as Agents of Change in International Law – making and Organisation’ (2012) 
(1):3 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law at 101. 
60 The International Group of P&I Clubs “recommend shipowners take all lawful, prudent and appropriate measures 
to harden ships against attack as outlined in the most recent version of the Best Management Practices (BMP)” – 
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governments should consider the document when developing or reviewing their policies on 
PCASP. 
 
2.2.1 Divided command 
An issue which needed to be urgently addressed was the chain of command on board vessels.  
The presence of PCASP, usually ex-military trained marines, could create a situation of divided 
command that might result in liability issues for shipowners and in turn, their insurers were an 
incident to occur. Having a PCASP team with a team leader on board a vessel under the 
command of the ‘Master’61 may result in divided command when the vessel is under attack.  This 
places both the owners and the Master at risk of falling foul of the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)62 if his/her ultimate command is compromised.63  The PMSC 
may argue that “the right to self-defence outweighs the Master’s overall responsibility to his/her 
crew and environment”.64 
The guidelines advise shipowners to obtain a clear statement from the PMSC that the Master of 
the vessel “remains in command and retains the overriding authority on board, and an agreed 
procedure in the event of the Master being unavailable”.65  Issues could arise where lethal force 
is utilised and the consequence is “outsourced to the captain of the private ship”.66  However, the 
practise has been to insert a clause that transfers the Master’s authority to utilise force to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available at http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/ig-updates-piracy-faqs-august-2013-38707/ accessed on 11 
November 2013. 
61 Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951, as amended:Section 2: "master" means, in relation to a ship, any person 
(other than a pilot) having charge or command of such ship. 
62 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, London: United Nations. 
63 Article 34(1) of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974; 
The Owner, Charterer, the Company operating the ship as defined in Regulation 1x/1 or any other person shall 
not prevent or restrict the Master of the Ship from taking or executing any decision which, in the Master’s 
professional judgment, is necessary for the safety of life at sea and protection of the marine environment. 
64 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy: Issues arising from the use of armed guards’ (page 2), Ince & Co Publication 2011 
available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-
arising-from-the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
65 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, paragraph 5.9. 
66 Clive R. Symmons ‘Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial 
Vessels:  International Legal Consequences and Problems under the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 51/1 Military Law and 
the Law of War Review at 42. 
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PCASP under certain circumstances and this could contravene the provisions of SOLAS.67  
Dutton is of the view that merely noting that the Captain has ultimate command and authority to 
order the use of force “can leave room for interpretation – and for errors”.68  In contrast, 
Symmons argues that the Master may intervene and order a ceasefire if he/she perceives a “threat 
to the safety of his crew or marine environment”.69  The issue that arises is the question of who 
has the ultimate authority to decide to engage a perceived threat; does the armed guards’ right to 
self-defence outweigh the Master’s duty to protect his/her crew and the marine environment?  
One would think that the right to life is the primary right; however, a well-documented set of 
rules and procedures in the event of an attack, along with efficient communication should ensure 
that any decision taken by either party on board has been discussed and sufficiently considered. 
 
2.2.2 Rules on the use of force 
The issue of the rules on the use of force (RUF) by a PCASP team is addressed in the IMO 
recommendations as well as the BIMCO Guardcon contract70 and it is suggested that these be 
incorporated in or attached to the security contract between vessel owners and PMSC.71  The 
Guidance to Shipowners states that it is “essential that all PCASP have a complete understanding 
                                                          
67 Clive R. Symmons ‘Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial 
Vessels:  International Legal Consequences and Problems under the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 51/1 Military Law and 
the Law of War Review at 43. 
68 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law at 153. 
69 Clive R. Symmons ‘Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial 
Vessels: International Legal Consequences and Problems under the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 51/1 Military Law and 
the Law of War Review at 43. 
70 The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) providing a 
wide range of services to the shipping industry with its head office in Copenhagen, Denmark.  BIMCOs main 
objective is “to facilitate the commercial operations of its membership by means of developing standard contracts 
and clauses, and providing quality information, advice, and education”.  See generally https://www.bimco.org 
accessed on 16 March 2014.  BIMCO Guardcon is a standard form contract for the employment of security guards 
on vessels – published 28 March 2012 available at 
https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Chartering/Document_Samples/Sundry_Other_Forms/Sample_Copy_GUARDCO
N__04_01_2013.ashx accessed on 16 March 2014. 
71 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy: Issues arising from the use of armed guards’ (page 3), Ince & Co Publication 2011 
available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-
arising-from-the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
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of the rules for the use of force as agreed between shipowners, PMSC and master”.72  The rules 
must be in writing and be agreed to by the parties providing security and having overall 
command of the vessel.  There should be consistency in the RUF to ensure clarity to all those on 
board the vessel, including the Master and crew. 
The right to self-defence is listed as a primary reason to utilise firearms on board.73 The final 
decision on what the RUF entail is left to shipowners and PMSC because risk assessment and 
standard operating procedures may differ slightly between the parties.  Dutton notes that “[T]he 
need to avoid chaos on the high seas is good reason for states to provide clear, detailed, and 
uniform guidance”.74  The BIMCO Guardcon contract makes express provision for a written set 
of rules on the RUF in the form of an annexure.75  BIMCO similarly provides for the overriding 
exception that firearms can be used in self-defence or the defence of others.76 
2.2.3 Notification to interested parties 
The IMO strongly recommends that shipowners notify their vessels’ flag state and their P&I 
insurers of their decision to use PCASP aboard their vessels.77  Askins suggests that it would be 
“prudent to discuss the use of armed guards with underwriters and cargo owners and an 
agreement should be reached with charterers on any expected deviation as a result of 
embarkation or the presence of PCASP (for fear of falling foul of the charter party for an 
unreasonable deviation from the intended route)”.78 
In essence, the Guidance to Shipowners sets out a list of requirements that should be adhered to 
prior to authorising the use of PMSC.  The support of the P&I Clubs is important for shipowners, 
                                                          
72 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, paragraph 
5.13. 
73 Ibid para 5.15. 
74 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law at 155. 
75 BIMCO Guardcon Contract – Box 18 and Clause 3 of the Individual waivers to be signed by PSCAP boarding the 
vessel and Clause 8(b) and (c) of Masters Authority - makes reference to the set RUF attached to the agreement. 
76 BIMCO Guardcon Clause 8(d) and; IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and 
Shipmasters on the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, 
MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, para. 5.15. 
77 Ibid para 3.1 and 5.2. 
78 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy:  Issues arising from the use of armed guards’ (page 3), Ince & Co Publication 2011 
available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-
arising-from-the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
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as to fall foul of the terms of their P&I cover will result in the possible repudiation of claims.  
Furthermore P&I Clubs are known to reduce the war risk, kidnap and ransom premium by up to 
50 per cent for members whose vessels carry a four-person armed security team on board whilst 
transiting the HRA.79 
2.2.4 Risk assessment 
The criteria for conducting a risk assessment of PMSC are set out in the Guidance to Shipowners 
that specifically recommend that a due diligence be undertaken of experience, financial standing 
and the extent of comprehensive insurance cover held by the PMSC.80  PMSC should 
demonstrate the following to shipowners: 
 access to maritime legal representatives in port/coastal states,  
 understanding of port states’ requirements for the presence,  
 movement and/or facilitation of PCASP within their territory,  
 background and criminal checks of PMSC personnel,  
 adequate training and certification for the use of security equipment  and importantly,  
 maritime as opposed to land based experience.81 
 
2.2.5 Control of import, export and licensing of weapons 
The management of firearms82 during transit, embarkation and disembarkation requires 
regulation as without the presence of weaponry, there would be fewer complications in having 
security personnel on board.  The Guidance to Shipowners states that the PMSC should ensure 
                                                          
79 International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs ‘Marsh: Piracy – the insurance implications’ - page 9 
available at http://www.igpandi.org/downloadables/piracy/news/Marsh%20Piracy%20implications.pdf accessed on 
11 November 2013.  M Mineau ‘Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Security: The rise of Private Navies in response 
to Modern Piracy’ (2010) Vol. 9 (1) Journal of International Business and Law at 67.   
80 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, paragraph 3 – 
4. 
81 Ibid para 4 - 5. 
82 All reference to firearms includes ammunition and security equipment. 
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“documentary compliance with the applicable flag, coastal and port State legislation”.83  The 
PMSC should avoid any complications with documentary compliance in a port state as this could 
have a major impact on the operations of the vessel and PCASP, costing shipowners money and 
causing delays in the delivery of cargo.  Askins states that the “licensing system needs to be 
streamlined”84 and the researcher is of the view that the necessary permit applications or 
permission from port state governmental authorities to allow the disembarkation of weapons in 
its territory should also be streamlined.  Any inconsistency and/or bureaucracy faced by owners 
or PMSC in port and coastal states, after permission has been granted by flag states, can impact 
the operations of the vessel and cause significant delays and wasteful expenditure.  Compliance 
with a multitude of jurisdictions’ laws on weapons permits is certainly no easy task.  Matters are 
further complicated by the fact that most countries accepting the entry into their territorial waters 
and ports of armed guards on board merchant vessels will be African and Middle Eastern 
countries – each with their own internal security concerns. 
Other factors to consider in the management of firearms include correct licences, certification, 
proof of purchase and a complete inventory of weaponry and procedures relating thereto.85  The 
Guidance to Shipowners states that there must be “full legal compliance with any applicable 
licences, national jurisdiction and port state laws”.86  It requires that the number of weapons, 
ammunition and serial numbers be recorded.  There should be standard procedures for on board 
and land based stowage of weapons as well as a prohibition on where and when not to handle 
same.87 
The IMO suggests that the categorisation of the PCASP should be determined by the flag state.88  
On the other hand, the BIMCO Guardcon contract provides for the categorisation of PCASP on 
board vessels as “supernumeries”89.  This is also accepted by the Panamanian Maritime 
                                                          
83 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, para. 5.12(1). 
84 Stephen Askins ‘Piracy: Issues arising from the use of armed guards’ (page 4), Ince & Co Publication 2011 
available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20Publications/Publications/Piracy/Ince_Piracy-issues-
arising-from-the-use-of-armed-guards.pdf accessed on 9 November 2013. 
85 IMO Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, paragraph 
5.12. 
86 Ibid para 5.12. 
87 Ibid para 5.12(3) and (4). 
88 Ibid para 5.20.  
89 BIMCO Guardcon contract - Clause 7 (j). 
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Authorities.90  The alternative would be for PCASP to be listed as crew.  The researcher is of the 
view that a clear distinction between crew and PCASP allows for transparency in the industry 
and for port state control measures.  Supernumeries means “exceeding the usual”91 and is an 
indication, in shipping terms, that persons so categorised are not part of the vessel’s crew. 
The guidelines that shipowners should consider prior to utilising the services of a PMSC have 
been selected as they will be linked to the South African policy on armed guards.  One can 
envisage the major complications shipowners and PMSC could face where a flag, port or coastal 
state’s existing laws on the movement of weaponry through its territory or on board ships flying 
its flag “may not have been developed taking into account or to cater for the various scenarios 
related to the embarkation or disembarkation of PCASP or of their firearms or security-related 
equipment, or for the arrival...”92 
 
2.3 IMO Recommendations to Flag States 
This study focuses on South Africa, which has no merchant vessels registered under its flag but 
is an important port state.  Durban is the busiest port in Africa and has the largest container 
handling infrastructure in the southern hemisphere.93  As a port state, South Africa should 
consider the IMO guidelines to flag states on the use of PCASP in developing its own laws and 
policies. 
The Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States (Flag State Recommendations)94 are not 
intended to force flag states to adopt certain policies but strongly urge governments to develop 
and publish legislation that either allows for or prohibits the use of PCASP.95  The document 
                                                          
90 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Requirements regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel 
on board Panamanian Flagged Vessels’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-228 (6 July 2011) para.4 - available at 
http://www.skuld.com/upload/INSIGHT/Piracy/Panama-MMC-228.pdf - accessed on 16 November 2013. 
91Merriam-Webster online dictionary available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supernumerary 
accessed on 16 March 2014. 
92 IMO Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States Regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1 – Introduction para. 6. 
93 Department of Public Enterprises website and facts on Transnet limited as a state owned company, available at 
http://www.dpe.gov.za/state-pg-9-32 accessed on 24 November 2013. 
94 IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area.  MSC.1/Circ. 1406/Rev.2 (25 May 2012). 
95IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
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states that “the carriage of such personnel and their firearms and security related equipment is 
subject to flag state legislation and policies”,96 thereby affirming the sovereignty of member 
states to determine whether to allow the use of PCASP.  However, the IMO requires flag states 
to clarify their position on armed guards to the organisation for circulation to all member states.97 
The Flag State Recommendations are short on detail and suggest that if a flag state does decide 
to allow the use of PCASP minimum requirements should be considered in the policy document. 
98 
The publication of the Flag State Recommendations led a number of member states to amend 
their policies permitting the use of PCASP on board vessels flying their flag; Greece, Denmark, 
the Isle of Man, Liberia, Malta, Marshal Islands, Singapore, Finland, Panama, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America amended 
their policies/laws on armed guards.99 
The Flag State Recommendations and the reaction thereto are not considered in detail as the 
study focuses on South Africa’s policy on PCASP on board vessels arriving in its territory.  It is, 
however, worth noting that the Flag State Recommendations should be read in conjunction with 
the IMO Guidelines to port states100 and shipowners.101 
 
2.4 IMO Recommendations to Port or Coastal States 
The recommendations discussed in this section are important in understanding South Africa’s 
laws and policies on permitting, and the movement and storage of weapons entering South 
African ports on board merchant vessels deploying PCASP as well as whether these laws 
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98 Ibid annex para. 2.3 - 2.5. 
99 International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), European Community Shipowners Associations (ECSA) ‘Comparison 
of Flag state laws on armed guards and arms on board’ (June 2012) BIMCO publication available at 
https://www.bimco.org/en/Security/Piracy/Guidance_on_piracy/~/media/Security/Piracy/Private_Armed_Guards_Fl
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100 IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area.  MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1. 
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effectively facilitate such activities in line with the international guidelines to coastal states on 
the use of PCASP. 
South Africa is a member state of the UN and IMO and although voluntary, member states are 
encouraged to adopt policies consistent with those of the IMO and other UN sub-committees.  
The IMO Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States state: 
 
…Member Governments… should have in place policies and procedures... Such policies and 
procedures... should facilitate the movement of PCASP and of their firearms.102 
 
The port state recommendations came at a critical period for the shipping industry when the 
number of member states favouring the use of armed guards on vessels transiting the HRA was 
increasing.103 
The MSC recognised that “there was an urgent need to develop further recommendations to 
Governments, and, in particular, for port states, on aspects related to the embarkation, 
disembarkation and carriage of PCASP and firearms”.104  The issue of armed guards is complex 
in that numerous interested parties need to be considered, particularly since it relates to the 
movement of weapons.  The MSC recognised that although flag state authorisation may be 
granted, “the facilitation of the movement of PCASP was affected by the national legislation and 
policies of port states and there was a need to address the concerns of port states with regards to 
the presence of PCASP and firearms… in their territorial seas”.105  This is illustrated by the 
bureaucratic nature and various interpretations of existing legislation in South Africa when trying 
                                                          
102 IMO Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Armed Security 
Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1408 (16 September 2011) and subsequently 
revised in IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Armed 
Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1408/Rev.1 (25 May 2012):  Annex 
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to obtain permits and authorisation for the landing of PCASP during 2011; this is discussed in 
Chapter Four with reference to unreported case law. 
The port state recommendations suggest that member states develop policies with regard to 
embarkation, disembarkation and vessels with PCASP and firearms on board.  Issues such as 
relevant notification of the authorities, transport, storage and declaration of weapons, 
identification of PCASP team members and flag state authorisation of the presence of PCASP on 
board should be considered when developing such policies and procedures.106 
Member states are “urged to bring the port recommendations to the attention of all national 
authorities concerned with border control issues”107 and to “bring to the attention of the MSC the 
results of the experience gained from the use of the port recommendations”.108 
A member state’s sovereignty is not threatened as the “recommendations are not intended to 
override or otherwise interfere with the implementation and enforcement of national 
legislation”.109 
PMSC firms and vessel owners “need to know whether and under what conditions the 
embarkation and disembarkation of PCASP and firearms is allowed” in port states.110  Member 
states’ policies should “facilitate the movement of PCASP”.111  The port state recommendations 
state that “such policies and procedures should be made known to the shipping industry and 
PCASP service providers and communicated to the IMO in order to enable flag states to act 
accordingly”.112 
Communication is a key feature of the port state recommendations and the IMO published a 
questionnaire113 which coastal member states were urged to complete and submit to the MSC by 
30 November 2011, preferably attaching a copy of their national legislation regulating the 
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110 IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Armed 
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presence of armed guards in their ports.114  The IMO has received responses from 20115 coastal 
states. However, South Africa’s response is nearly two-and-a-half years overdue.116   
Reference to South Africa’s position on armed guards arriving in its ports is contained in a notice 
from P&I Associates (Pty) Ltd, a local company acting as the correspondent for international 
P&I Clubs, dated 20 February 2010117 distributed amongst the International Group of Protection 
and Indemnity Clubs.118  This highlights that an application for a firearms permit must be 
submitted to the South African Police Service (SAPS) at least 21 days prior to the arrival of the 
armed guards, failing which Masters of vessels may be arrested and criminally charged for 
contravening the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 (FCA).119 The SAPS set out their 
interpretation of the applicability of the FCA in a letter addressed to the South African 
Association of Ship Operators and Agents and confirmed the “21 day rule”.120  Some authors 
have noted that this rule applies,121 whilst others state that in 2012 South Africa would not allow 
armed guards in its territorial waters.122 
                                                          
114 Ibid para 8. 
115 These states include Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, France, Hong Kong, China, India, Israel, Jordan, Liberia, 
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‘Responses received from port and coastal State requirements related to privately contracted armed security 
personnel (PCASP)’ (17 November 2011) available at 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Responses-received-on-
Private%20Armed%20Security.aspx accessed on 5 April 2014. 
116 Ibid. 
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sea ports of entry, used by private armed security agencies to protect vessels from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ 
– SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban Harbour addressed to the SAASOA 
Durban Chapter Chairperson, 28 February 2011, (Ref: 3/5/1) annexed to this study marked “B” item 3. Protection 
Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case 
Number 3390/2011 annexed to the replying affidavit of Mark Andrew Wilson (see paragraph 4.6) marked 
“MAW9”. 
121 Ruwantissa, Abeyratne ‘The use of armed guards on board merchant vessels’ (2012) 5 Journal of Transportation 
Security at 159 available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12198-012-0088-5# accessed on 13 March 
2014. 
122 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law at 122. 
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The MSC acknowledged that local legislation or policies may not cater for the “very recent and 
still evolving development”123 of the use of PCASP on board merchant vessels.  Member states 
“should not establish policies and procedures which hinder or may hinder the continuation of 
maritime trade or interfere with the navigation of ships and should ensure that all are consistent 
with international law”.124 
Pizor states that, “[I]n order for armed guards to provide the necessary protection against pirates, 
the laws of the coastal and flag state countries need to allow merchant ships to hire armed 
guards.  Countries need to amend their maritime law (sic) so ships can be protected in all seas, 
whether territorial or international.  Countries can then continue to control the safety in territorial 
waters through regulations and licensing schemes.”125  Pizor comments that “a unified standard 
will help ships travelling to several ports on the same trip to ensure compliance with all 
regulations.”126  It is suggested that the guidelines require littoral states to be consistent in their 
policies on armed guards in order to assist PMSC to ensure compliance with the laws in the 
territories within which the teams will transit.127 
 
2.5 IMO Guidelines to Private Maritime Security Companies 
In 2012, the IMO addressed the growing maritime security industry by publishing interim 
guidelines on PMSC.128  The PMSC Guidelines were designed to complement international 
policies relating to the issue of armed guards129, thereby ensuring consistent development of 
policies.  Member states “are also urged to take any necessary action to ensure the 
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implementation, as appropriate, of the interim guidance given in the annex”.130  The MSC 
recognises that there is no international law or standard which governs the unique position of 
armed guards on merchant vessels.  The PMSC Guidelines “would improve governance, reduce 
the potential for accidents and promote competent, safe and lawful conduct at sea”.131 
PMSC are urged to obtain the necessary prior authorisation from the flag state before PCASP 
board a vessel for transit, as well as the country where the PMSC is registered and states in 
which operations will be conducted or through which teams will transit.132  This is relevant for 
South Africa as a port state since PCASP teams have and continue to transit and conduct 
operations in South African territory.   
The PMSC Guidelines are not binding but “provide minimum recommendations on the 
competencies and abilities a professional PMSC is expected to have”.133  They therefore assist 
shipowners, and port and flag states when faced with a request for permission for a PCASP team 
to enter their territory or board a vessel with weapons.  The PMSC Guidelines recommend that 
the PMSC provide supporting documentation to enable a shipowner to undertake a due diligence 
exercise which includes demonstrating access to maritime legal advice in the areas of 
operation.134  This includes the licensing and permitting of weapons. 
The PMSC must “establish competence and experience in maritime and piracy awareness as 
opposed to land based skill”.135  It must have a working knowledge of BMP 4 and provide 
testimonials from previous clients.136  There should be an established policy on vetting PCASP 
including background checks, criminal record checks and employment history verification.  An 
employee should demonstrate via documentary proof adequate weapons, rules of force and all 
relevant policy training.137  This is important for vessel owners as they require competent 
security personnel to protect their assets and crew.  For example, the majority of PCASP are ex-
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Royal British Marines. A number of British PMSC have a policy that only these men and woman 
will be employed to provide protection on the high seas.138 
 
2.5.1 Management of firearms 
Paragraph 5 of the Annex to the PMSC Guidelines sets out the standard recommendations for 
management of the firearms carried by PCASP.  PMSC should provide proof of compliance with 
port and coastal states’ laws relating to the carriage, storage, embarkation and disembarkation of 
weapons.139  There should be provision for stowage of the weapons on board as well as 
containers in which the equipment will be transferred on and off a vessel.140  In essence, this 
means that the PMSC should adopt codified procedures for the movement, storage and handling 
of the weapons – self regulation according to the specific needs and requirements of PMSC, 
vessel owners and transiting port state regulations. 
The procedures for the management of firearms should comply with port state legislation.  South 
Africa thus has an opportunity to publish policies or clarify the existing firearms permit 
procedures so that PMSC can adhere thereto prior to their arrival in South African territory.  The 
researcher will recommend amendments to the current legislation whilst considering the PMSC 
Guidelines.   
The rules of force should be agreed in writing between shipowners and PMSC.141  This is a 
common theme throughout the IMO recommendations and is important for the regulation of 
PCASP. 
The MSC recommends that there be a clear policy on record keeping and incident reporting by 
the PMSC.142 This is to ensure that information is shared between member states and shipowners 
in order to promote transparency in the industry. 
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The PMSC Guidelines have been welcomed by the Security Association of the Maritime 
Industry (SAMI)143 in light of the increased number of PMSC offering armed maritime security 
services.144  The SAMI has developed a three stage accreditation process for its 57 members145 
including due diligence, system checks and a site visit.146  The SAMI self-regulation system for 
PMSC will enhance safety within the maritime security industry.  The potential for accidental 
injury or death is of concern to experts in the field of maritime security and the prevention of loss 
of life is of utmost importance.  In February 2012, two Indian fishermen were allegedly shot and 
killed by two Italian Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs)147 whilst providing protection 
against piracy on board the mv “Enrica Lexie”.148  It should be noted that there is a distinction 
between VPDs who are military personnel hired from the state by commercial vessel 
owners/operators and PCASP who are privately contracted armed security providers not in the 
service of a state’s military.  This incident nevertheless highlights the issues that could arise with 
the placement of armed protection personnel on board merchant vessels as a means of self 
defence against piratical attack.149  The VPDs allegedly mistook the unarmed fishermen for 
pirates and this led to vigorous diplomatic engagement between the two countries.  The Italians 
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were permitted to return home to vote in the general elections and have since returned to India to 
face charges.  This was not without controversy because the Italian government initially refused 
to send the VPDs back to face trial in the Indian Supreme Court despite an undertaking to do 
so.150  Important issues of law will be addressed in the trial as it is alleged that the incident took 
place in international waters on an Italian flagged vessel.151  The Italian government will argue, 
on behalf of its two citizens, that the Indian courts do not have jurisdiction as the incident did not 
occur within Indian territorial waters, and, in the alternative, that the VPDs acted in self-
defence152. 
The policies of port states and flag states, that have the largest vessel registry and which exercise 
jurisdiction over a transit route leading to and from the Gulf of Aden or situated nearby are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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THE GLOBAL RESPONSE 
3.1 Foreign jurisdiction laws and policies 
This chapter discusses five IMO member states’ policies on armed guards with regard to vessels 
flying their flag and/or transiting through their territory.  It also examines the policies of states 
which have been identified as PCASP hub points and which facilitate the movement of teams in 
their territory. 
It is important at the outset to distinguish between flag states’ laws on authorisation of the use of 
PCASP on vessels and port or coastal states’ laws regarding the transiting of weapons through 
the territory.  The policies of both flag and coastal states on armed guards are analysed in order 
to assist South Africa to develop its laws to facilitate the movement of PCASP and weapons in 
its territory.   
Egypt’s policies on armed guards transiting through its territory, namely the Suez Canal, are 
highlighted because of the significant changes that took place in respect of those policies within 
a period of six months, and the importance of the Suez as a transit route to the Gulf of Aden.  
The Egyptian policies are further relevant for the purpose of this study that focuses on the port 
state regulation of PCASP, in particular, South Africa’s position as a port state on the east coast 
of Africa.  Comparative reference is made to the policies of other states having jurisdiction near 
the Gulf of Aden and academic commentary thereon. 
Panama has the largest tonnage in the world registered under its flag153 and it is therefore 
important to determine whether the maritime administration permits the presence of PCASP on 
board vessels flying its flag.  This is relevant as a large number of these vessels will be calling at 
South African ports, and it is a useful means of examining the consequences of inconsistencies 
between flag state policies and the position adopted by South Africa as a port state. 
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This chapter also discusses developments that led to the promulgation of the Italian law decree 
107/2011 on the use of VPDs.  It is useful to consider the alternative open to states of authorising 
the use of VPDs rather than PCASP.  The disadvantages of adopting such a policy are 
highlighted with reference to the mv “Enrica Lexie” mentioned in Chapter Two.  The Italian 
government is responsible for the actions of the naval officers even though they were deployed 
on a merchant and not a naval vessel (or warship).  They are in the employ of or are state agents 
and this could lead to diplomatic issues between states where an incident occurs.  
The amendments to the Norwegian Ship and Security Act154 and the United Kingdom (UK) 
guidance from the Department for Transport are discussed as both nations are described as 




The Suez Canal is subject to the Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez 
Maritime Canal 1888 (Constantinople Convention) which guarantees the “free right of passage 
of all vessels irrespective of flag and contracting states may not interfere with the free use of the 
canal”.157  The Suez Canal falls within the Egyptian territorial sea and is arguably the most 
important transit lane in the world.  Egyptian laws apply to vessels intending to transit through 
the Canal. 
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The policies adopted by Egypt are an example of how a coastal state’s decision to reverse the 
permitting of armed guards moving through its territory can potentially affect PMSC and vessel 
operations.  For example, if the Egyptian authorities declare that PCASP are not permitted to 
transit through the Suez Canal with weapons on board whilst a vessel is two days sailing distance 
from the Canal, the PMSC and vessel owners will have to make urgent alternative arrangements 
to disembark the weapons prior to entering Egyptian territory.  The vessel could be diverted to an 
unscheduled port or the PMSC will need to make arrangements to deploy a small craft to take 
possession of the weapons – by transferring out at sea.  This will inevitably cause delays and 
increased costs for both the PMSC and shipowner. 
Political instability in Egypt substantially affected vessel and PMSC operations because of the 
blanket prohibition of armed guards on vessels entering the Suez Canal.  This is recorded in a 
Notice from the Head of the Maritime Transport Sector, dated 29 August 2011 addressed to the 
Alex Shipping Chamber.158  A meeting with the Egyptian Armed Forces concluded with the 
decision “not to allow commercial vessels to have arms/security teams on board, as this is 
contrary to International Maritime Law”.159  The notice re-iterated that, “the Suez Gulf is entirely 
Egyptian territorial water” and that “the Master or the Agent of the vessel shall provide a 
Commitment letter to the Pilot and Port Authority stating that the vessel does not have any arms 
or ammunition on board used for securing the vessel”160 upon the boarding of the pilot in 
Egyptian territory. 
The notice does not clarify on what grounds the presence of PCASP on board merchant vessels is 
“contrary to international maritime law”.  The IMO Guidelines to Shipowners and Flag States, 
discussed in Chapter Two, tacitly authorised the use of PCASP on board vessels as a means of 
protection against piracy and were published in May of the same year, 2011.161  A member state 
has exclusive sovereignty over its territorial sea; however, this is subject to a vessel’s right to 
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innocent passage.162  The IMO expressly confirmed that “no international guidance or standards 
exist at present for PMSC”.163  The researcher is thus of the view that the Egyptian authorities 
were mistaken and that, in general terms, there is no contravention of international maritime law 
if a PCASP team is on board a merchant vessel.  The Egyptian notice simply refers to 
‘international law’ without identifying a specific law.  The relevant law is Article 19 of 
UNCLOS which provides the right of free passage, “provided the innocent passage is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state”.164  Article 19(2) of 
UNCLOS sets out various categories of non-innocent activity including, “any exercise or 
practice with weapons”.165  Petrig states that “it seems difficult to argue that the simple presence 
of arms or armed guards on board a private ship is a non-innocent activity” because “the use of 
armed force in self-defence or defence of others by PMSC personnel is thus not an active hostile 
use of force as required by the wording ‘any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind’”.166 
The extraordinary internal security situation in Egypt during 2011 with the uprising against the 
government of President Mubarak resulted in increased fears of weapons movement in Egyptian 
territory.  For example, Onuoha notes that Blackwater Worldwide, now operating as a PMSC, 
was investigated for arms trafficking in Iraq in 2007 whilst providing private military security 
services.167  Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the state to prohibit the 
transit of weapons through their territory by private security providers; however, it is submitted 
that such prohibition should have been made with clear reference to the provisions of 
international law and not based on an allegation that same is generally contrary to international 
maritime law.   
The notice expressly stated that the Master and crew of any vessel found with arms on board 
whilst in Egyptian territory would be subject to arrest, as would the vessel, and prosecution by 
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the Egyptian Prosecuting Authority.168  The IMO Guidelines to coastal states recommended that 
“member states should not establish policies and procedures which hinder or may hinder the 
continuation of maritime trade or interfere with the navigation of ships and should ensure that all 
are consistent with international law”.169  If it can be proved that vessels were delayed or 
diverted from Egyptian territorial waters, the researcher is of the view that the prohibition policy 
did in fact hinder maritime trade and/or interfere with the navigation of ships.  For example, a 
vessel on a liner trade carrying armed guards that is heading towards the Suez Canal to deliver 
cargo to a European country two days prior to the issue of the Egyptian notice would have been 
forced to call at an unscheduled port and/or make arrangements for the transfer of the PCASP 
and weapons from the vessel.  The costs and logistical implications could run into tens of 
thousands of dollars. 
In September 2011, the Egyptian Ministry of Transport objected to the Ministry of Defence’s 
requirements set out in the 29 August 2011 notice, “on the basis that this decision is quite 
difficult to adopt and would lead to a negative impact on shipping through Suez Canal (sic)”.170  
After discussions between the Ministry of Defence, Department of Transport and Suez Canal 
Authority, it was agreed that vessels transiting the Suez Canal may carry armed guards on board 
provided “written authorization from flag state, details of arms and ammunition, full details of 
the PMSC, the number of guards on board as well as a declaration that the weapons will not be 
used in Egyptian territorial waters is submitted”.171 
This agreement was revoked in January 2012 when the Head of the Maritime Sector issued 
another notice to the Chairman of the Port Said Chamber of Shipping, and to shipping agents, 
setting out the change in policy on PCASP on board vessels in Egyptian territory.172 
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Masters calling at Egyptian ports with arms on board are now required to “certify that weapons 
are under lock in a closed box and are to be delivered to the port police upon berthing, to be 
returned at time of departure”.173  The notice states that: “for Suez Canal transiting commercial 
vessels, the port security police, will receive the weapons on board at the entry point and 
transport it by land, then redeliver it to the vessel again at point of canal exit”.174  At first glance 
this seems reasonable; however, the Suez Canal is 193.30 kilometres175 in length from point of 
entry to point of exit.  The policy therefore requires land based transport of the weapons to the 
entry and exit points of the canal.   
This policy raises a number of issues:   
1. Who will pay for the transport of the weapons on land? 
2. Who would be liable should the weapons disappear whilst in police custody (not an 
unrealistic possibility bearing in mind the political instability in the country)? 
3. How will the weapons be disembarked and/or re-delivered to the vessel at the various 
entry and exit points? 
4. Who would pay for this exercise should the vessel need to come into port, or, 
alternatively, need to utilise the services of a launch boat? 
5. Would the fact that the weapons are no longer in the possession of the PCASP team 
members, albeit for a number of days, have the potential to affect the shipowner’s and/or 
PMSC’s insurance cover? 
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6. What are the implications for the PMSC’s firearms licence should the weapons be 
delivered into the custody of persons not authorised to possess same? 
All the above, and many more, questions raise serious issues with the Egyptian policy on taking 
possession of the weapons for redelivery at the exit points of the Canal.  It was reported that the 
United States Coast Guard had made special arrangements with the Suez Canal authority for the 
hand-over of US weapons as the requirement “violated International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations”.176 
It is reported that numerous PMSC firms are avoiding the complications in Egyptian territory by 
chartering smaller tonnage vessels in and around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden with an armoury 
large enough to supply ships entering and exiting the Suez Canal.  These supply vessels are 
stationed in international waters,177 thereby avoiding the jurisdiction of Egyptian defence and 
police authorities and other port states’ “arms trafficking regulations”.178  Dutton describes the 
situation as follows: “the need to comply with varying and shifting state weapons laws as one of 
the greatest burdens faced by ships seeking to use armed security personnel for protection and 
the reason why some private security companies are stocking ‘floating armories [sic]’ on the 
high seas”179, while Shah states that floating armouries have “morphed into another source of 
anxiety confronting the international community, their existence on the ‘fringes of legality’... has 
created reservations and even outright suspicion in States over these entities.”180 
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In 2011 a Protection Vessels International (PVI)181 security team was arrested by the Eritrean 
Police and was accused of undermining Eritrea’s security by being in possession of weapons on 
an uninhabited island in its territory.  Political intervention by the British Government as well as 
an apology resulted in the PCASP being released without further charges and the matter was 
downplayed as an “operational error”.182  PVI issued a statement that their vessel needed to re-
fuel in Eritrea and that they decided to discharge the weapons and ammunition on the small 
island so as not to take the security equipment into port.183 
The arrest of the PVI security team took place during the various changes in Egyptian policies on 
armed guards, namely, late 2011.  Whilst it cannot be suggested that the PVI incident is directly 
linked to the Egyptian shift in policy, the incident highlights the importance of ensuring full 
cooperation between governments with coastlines that border the HRA and greater Indian Ocean, 
including South Africa.  McMahon comment that various policies in littoral states have led to the 
increased use of floating armouries in the Indian Ocean.184  Changes in policy can have a major 
impact on operations and result in the arrest of PCASP or Masters in circumstances where there 
may have been confusion about the applicable laws and policies, and no intentional violation of 
state law. 
Thus, whilst Egypt initially imposed a blanket prohibition, it now accommodates weapons 
embarkation only if the weapons are removed from the vessel when entering Egyptian waters 
and transported or stored by Government officials.  However a number of other states have 
provided blanket approval for the operation of PCASP.  These options are considered further in 
section 3.3, the analysis of South Africa's laws and policies in Chapter Four, and the 
recommendations in Chapter Five. 
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3.3 Policies of other Coastal States around the Gulf of Aden.  
 
The states of Djibouti,185 Mauritius186 and Sri Lanka187 allow the embarkation/disembarkation of 
PCASP within their territory.188  Brown notes that “The Sri Lankan Government provides 
comprehensive support for PMSCs...”189  Solace Global Maritime, a UK registered PMSC, 
discussed further in section 4.3.4, has authorisation from the governments of Djibouti, Mauritius, 
Tanzania and Oman in respect of firearms, ammunition and personnel movement in their 
respective territories.190 
It is reported that “Sri Lanka is one of the few countries in the region to authorise the transit of 
armed guards through their waters for on board protection of merchant ships and fishing 
vessels”.191  The PMSCs are vetted and the Sri Lankan defence ministry issue approvals to 
enable them to operate in Sri Lankan territory.192  It is estimated that up to 50 PMSCs are 
operating in Sri Lanka and some have entered into joint ventures with a government owned 
company.193  PMSCs are able to hire firearms and ammunition – to be returned within one month 
- from the Sri Lankan military and must employ a military officer in his or her personal capacity 
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to “monitor the use of the weapons”.194  Income is generated from the hire of weapons and 
storage of PMSC-owned equipment. However, the researcher is of the view that notwithstanding 
the Sri Lankan authorities’ general cooperation with PMSCs, South Africa should not adopt its 
policy on the hiring of firearms and ammunition.  Instead, the focus should be on the manner in 
which PMSCs are vetted, and given “prior approval” and weapons are permitted coupled with 
control of their movement in South African territory. 
Florquin reports that Djibouti charges US$150 000 per PMSC for annual permits to operate in its 
ports with weapons.195  Firearms and ammunition are available for rental by a single authorised 
company, Djibouti Maritime Security Services (DMSS).196  Florquin further reports that DMSS 
“operates a fast supply vessel that allows it to go to sea to retrieve weapons from returning ships 
before they move on to other ports that do not allow armed guards to enter”.197  The Djibouti 
annual permit system thus allows for the free movement of personnel and weapons prior to and 
after transit through the Gulf of Aden, thereby optimally utilising its geographical location. 
The Republic of Mauritius merely requires “24 hours (preferably 48 hrs)” notice from a vessel 
carrying armed security personnel.198  The vessel must supply details of the firearms, security 
personnel and “[A] letter of authorisation from The Commissioner of Police authorising Transit 
and Storage of Firearms and Ammunition” to the Mauritius Revenue Authority, Harbour Master 
and Mauritian Police.199  Proof of flag state authorisation for the use of PCASP must be 
submitted to the Mauritius Police and “in order to operate in the territorial waters of Mauritius, 
foreign Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) providing services of PCASP onboard 
vessels, need to obtain prior authorisation of the Government of Mauritius (Prime Minister’s 
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Office)”.200  This is a “prior approval” process which takes approximately one month and 
thereafter details of subsequent vessels and teams are to be submitted preferably on 48 hours’ 
notice.  The response from Mauritius to the IMO questionnaire lists, in detail, the various 
authorities that need to be notified of the arrival of armed guards, including the Port Master, 
National Coast Guard, Harbour Police and Commissioner of Police.201  The Mauritian authorities 
require information relating to the “bona fides” of the PMSC, firearms licenses, and 
authorisation from the country of registration and purchase of firearms, security bonds and 
indemnities.202  The Mauritian Police require that weapons disembarked in port be handed over 
into their custody for transport to a storage facility and a charge is levied.203  The remainder of 
the response sets out in detail which authority requires certain documents.  There is collaboration 
between the Customs, Police, Harbour Master and Port Authority with regards to PCASP 
arriving in Mauritian territory. 
The researcher is of the view that South Africa should model its procedures on the Mauritian 
framework, especially, the prior approval and “authorization” of PMSC to operate in its territory.  
The period of one month to obtain approval is reasonable considering that the intention is for 
vessels to only submit 48 hours’ notice of arrival of a PCASP thereafter.  However, the storage 
of weapons can be undertaken by South African gunsmiths with the requisite storage licenses, as 
has been the procedure for PMSCs operating in South African territory, instead of placing this 
extra burden and cost on the SAPS.204 
The researcher suggests that the South African government consider the proactive approach of 
these countries and implement policies that will facilitate the movement of PCASP in its ports 
because “PMSCs have a legitimate and probably increasing, long-term role in the counter-piracy 
fight and act therefore to recapture leadership of the policy and regulatory agenda related to their 
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use”.205  Florquin states that South Africa is a “key transit point[s]” which only allows semi-
automatic weapons to enter its territory.206  The researcher is of the view that Florquin’s 
statement, based on interviews with PMSCs in 2011, was in the midst of the “critical period” and 
the refusal to issue permits resulting in the seizure of weapons by the SAPS led to the three 
separate court cases discussed in Chapter Four.  In simple terms, if other states are able to 
accommodate the movement of PCASP in their territory and set out clear requirements and 
policies, provided security interests are considered, South Africa should have no difficulty in 




Approximately 21.5 per cent207 of the world’s merchant vessels (measured according to dead 
weight tonnage) are registered under the Panama flag and it is regarded as a flag of convenience 
because of the unrestricted nationalities of crew complement, tonnage tax regime208 and due to 
its protection of the identity of the shareholding of the shipowning companies “through a 
complex web of corporate entities”.209  It is important to examine the response of the 
Panamanian Maritime Authority (PMA) to the use of PCASP on ships flying its flag as this 
policy will apply to a large number of vessels calling at South African ports. 
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The PMA published its policy on armed guards in a Merchant Marine Circular.210  It makes 
direct reference to the IMO recommendations211 for the attention of all “ship owners, company 
security officers, legal representatives of Panamanian Flagged Vessels, Panamanian Merchant 
Marine Consulates and Recognized Organizations”.212 
The notice does not set out specific requirements for the authorisation of PCASP but rather 
directs interested parties to the IMO Circulars213 in deciding on the use of a PMSC to protect 
vessels transiting the HRA.  The PMA states that “ships, which intend hiring the services of 
private security firms, should provide the crew with the necessary training and information about 
the risks of having an armed team on board”.214 This is not commonly found in the polices 
published by other jurisdictions or IMO Guidelines and should, in the researcher’s view, be 
incorporated into BMP 4; as greater understanding of the roles of all on board will enhance the 
application of standard operating procedures in the event of imminent attack. 
Authorisation for the use of PMSC and a PCASP team was initially required from the General 
Directorate of Merchant Marine (GD) with the following documents in support of such 
permission, a “motivational letter from the owner requesting approval, a signed bi-lateral 
agreement between the owner and PMSC215, details of PCASP team and proof of training and 
experience of PCASP team members”.216 
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However, this requirement changed with a list of 79 PMSCs approved by the PMA that was 
published in a subsequent notice on 21 January 2013.217  It is expressly stated that authorisation 
from the GD is not required, provided one of the listed PMSCs is utilised on Panamanian flagged 
vessels, unless a port authority requests written authorisation from the PMA.218  The blanket 
approval for specific PMSCs will reduce the bureaucracy and red tape involved in obtaining 
authorisation for each Panamanian flagged vessel.  The researcher is of the view that a list of 
approved PMSCs should be considered by coastal states.  This would reduce the time required to 
vet each and every PMSC intending to enter a state’s port with weapons.  It will also prevent 
double vetting by flag and coastal states of the same PMSC.  If a listed PMSC is applying for a 
permit in a coastal state, the procedure to issue same should be more efficient without the need to 
verify the authenticity and standing of the company.  The researcher is not suggesting a complete 
waiver of permit or licensing requirements in port states, but rather that the burden on the 
authorities to process applications and issue the necessary documentation can be significantly 
reduced through cooperation with flag states and prior ‘blanket’ recognition of certain PMSCs. 
The PCASP must be enrolled as supernumeries219 on board all Panamanian flagged vessels and 
paragraph 5 states “all ship-owners when entering into a contract with a PMSC should ensure 
compliance with the IMO Guidelines to ship owners”.220  The Panama position allows for varied 
interpretation of the IMO Guidelines to shipowners including the manner in which risk 
assessment is conducted.  However, the list of approved PMSCs does create ambiguity in the 
requirements for shipowners.  Does due diligence of the selected PMSC still have to be 
undertaken if a listed PMSC is engaged to provide armed protection services?  The researcher is 
of the view that good practice dictates that shipowners should still undertake due diligence of 
‘listed’ PMSCs; however the process is streamlined by means of the choice of already 
“accepted” companies for provision of armed security services. 
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In summary, the list of approved PMSCs should be utilised by other flag states, and in particular, 
the South African authorities in adopting or amending its procedure and policies on armed 
guards as a port state. 
 
3.5 Italy 
On 11 October 2011, the Italian Ministry of Defence “Confitarma” signed a protocol for the 
deployment of Italian Navy officers on Italian flagged merchant vessels as protection against 
Somali pirates.221  The use of vessel protection detachments (VPDs) is notably different from the 
placement of private armed security personnel as the navy officers, or military protection teams 
(Nuclei militari di protezione) (NMPs) as they are sometimes referred to, are state and not 
private agents. 
It is interesting to note that, although the personnel are military officers, the owners of the 
merchant vessels are required to pay a daily rate of Euro 467.00 per officer including all 
ancillary costs associated with embarkation and disembarkation in port.222  The Italian policy can 
be considered a public-private collaboration between the government and shipowners.223  This is 
perhaps a more favourable approach as these highly trained active naval officers are accountable 
to the Minister of Defence, but are compensated by owners so as not to redirect government 
resources for the benefit of a private company.  Tondini argues that “Military VPDs are indeed 
characterized by a much greater level of transparency...” and if there is an incident, “breaches of 
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Confitarma’ at 5  (12 October 2011) available at http://www.garbamar.it/ON%20THE%20WAVE%20-
%20fifth%20issue%20-%20Pirateria%20-%20Piracy%20IV.pdf  accessed on 14 May 2013 with reference to the 
Italian protocol; Ministero della Difesa ‘Protocollo Di Intesa tra Ministero della Difesa e Confederazione Italiana 
Armatori (Confitarma)’ (11 October 2011)  available at 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/attivita/operativa/nmp/Documents/A_101011_Protocollo_Difesa_CONFITARMA_UG.
pdf accessed on 15 May 2014. 
223 Matteo Tondini ‘Some Legal and Non-Legal Reflections on the Use of Armed Protection Teams on Board 
Merchant Vessels: An Introduction to the Topic’ (2012) 51(1) Military Law and the Law of War Review at 16. 
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law are imputed to the VPD (and the sending State) only, and not to the master and the ship-
owner”.224 
The costs of logistical arrangements including transport, board, lodging and flights are borne by 
the owners.225  There must be third party insurance to cover third party liability for negligence 
based on damages caused by the NMPs whilst on board providing protection.226  The owner must 
indemnify the Ministry of Defence against claims for deviation due to any embarkation or 
disembarkation of NMPs and captured pirates.227  The authority of the Master of the vessel is 
confirmed but only in respect of “navigation and control decisions”.228  “The passive protective 
measures have [sic] to be handled with the coordination of the NMP leader”.229 This raises the 
issue of divided command in Chapter Two. 
The protocol requires the owners to take note “that the loading/unloading of NMP is easier at 
hub ports identified by the Navy”, an example being the Port of Djibouti.230  This could benefit 
South Africa should the policy accommodate PCASP (or VPDs/NMPs), and the country would 
thus be identified by shipowners, PMSC and naval forces as a suitable hub port.  As noted in 
Chapter Five, with the current surge in piracy off the coast of West Africa, combined with the 
existing threats off the East African coast, South African ports have the unique opportunity to be 
identified as preferred hub ports for embarkation and disembarkation of PCASP.  The advantages 
and risks are highlighted in Chapter Five. 
The use of NMPs in Italy’s response to piracy encountered problems relating to the capacity of 
available naval officers to provide protection.  On 2 October 2012 the Defence Committee of the 
                                                          
224 Ibid at 15 and 16. 
225 Studio Legale Garbarino Vergani ‘Piracy IV, Definitely signed the Protocol between Ministry of Defence and 
Confitarma’ at 5 (12 October 2011)  available at http://www.garbamar.it/ON%20THE%20WAVE%20-
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229 Ibid. 
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Italian Senate approved a resolution on armed guards on board vessels flying the Italian flag.231  
The committee suggested that clear resolutions be passed in favour of allowing PCASP on board 
as an alternative to NMPs. 
A number of items were highlighted in the resolutions, including: 
1. That agreements are reached with coastal states to avoid diplomatic clearance for NMPs 
for each vessel;232 
2. The piracy risk area is extended to the Gulf of Guinea;233 
3. Broader obligations and liabilities for PMSCs, including criminal and civil liability for 
shipowners and PMSCs for actions of their employees, namely PCASP;234 
4. Insurance cover is to be held by PMSCs;235 and 
5. Specific training courses have to be undertaken by PCASP.236 
The Italian Regulation on the deployment of armed guards on board vessels flying its flag was 
gazetted on 29 March 2013 under Law Decree 107/2011, amended by Law Decree 130/2011,237 
and came into force on 13 April 2013.238 
This signalled the Italian government’s determination that armed personnel assigned to vessels 
flying its flag must be regulated.  The regulation makes it compulsory in the first instance to 
                                                          
231 Senato della Republica, Defence 4th Standing Committee ‘Proposed Resolution Scheme by Speakers on the deal 
assigned # 747’ (27 September 2012) available at 
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232 Ibid para 2.  
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234 Ibid para 4. 
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Force at Sea’ (2012) 22 The Italian Yearbook of International Law at 50 available at http://www.sidi-isil.org/wp-
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deploy NMPs, and PCASP can only be deployed if NMPs are unavailable.  There is thus a slight 
deviation in the published regulation from the prior resolution.  Article 5 of the Law Decree 
further limits contractors that may be appointed as PCASP to Italian and European Union 
citizens and Italian security providers.239  Bevilacqua notes that the deployment of private 
security guards will be difficult as the conditions in the law decree will have to be met and only 
when a public team is unavailable, thus the “only enforceable option is that of vessel protection 
detachments”.240  Article 8 provides that the embarkation and disembarkation of weapons in 
coastal states must be “in compliance with the legislation of the states”.241  Flag states are once 
again placing an obligation on vessel owners to ensure compliance with coastal state laws and 
regulations on firearms.242 
There should be diplomatic agreements between flag and coastal states on the issue of armed 
guards.  There should be an open line of communication between states in order to regulate the 
private maritime security industry.  This approach would streamline any permit or vetting 
process that needs to be undertaken by flag and/or coastal and port states and also provide for a 




The Norwegian Government published amendments to its existing legislation243 in order to 
regulate the use of armed guards on board vessels flying its flag.  This took the form of 
amendments and additions to the regulations on protective security measures on board ships and 
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accessed on 15 May 2014. 
242 The remainder of the decree deals with reporting, training and documentation, the status of contractors (as 
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243 Act of 16 February 2007 No.9 relating to Ship Safety and Security (The Ship Safety and Security Act). 
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mobile offshore drilling units.244  The regulations “were published by the Norwegian maritime 
Directorate on 1 July 2011”245 (less than two months after the publication of the IMO Guidelines 
to Flag States) pursuant to powers delegated in terms of the Ship Safety and Security Act.246  
They apply to cargo ships with a gross tonnage of 500t or more which are certified for 
international trade.247 
Section 20 states that, “armed guards may be employed following the completion of a risk 
assessment and following consultation with the master”.248  The Master’s role and authority is 
expressly confirmed, which prevents divided command on board the vessel.249  Abeyratne points 
out that “much responsibility devolves upon the ship’s master who should also be consulted 
about the drafting of the procedures regarding armed personnel on board”.250 
Section 20 imposes strict obligations on vessel owners intending to deploy armed guards on their 
vessels.  They must submit documentary proof of the competency of the PMSC selected for the 
security contract.251  The industry guidelines for preventative measures would mean BMP4, 
installation of citadels, ship hardening installations and other non-lethal defensive equipment 
which must be considered prior to contracting armed guards for a Norwegian flagged vessel – in 
other words, a risk assessment.252  Notice must be given to the owners’ insurers prior to the use 
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of armed guards253 and there must be a set of procedures in place for the storage of firearms 
whilst on board.254 
Section 24 requires armed guards to give prior warning before engaging in the use of force, 
namely, light and sound signals as well as warning shots with the objective of rendering a person 
harmless.255  The prior warning requirement should perhaps be expressly agreed in the RUF 
between the owners and PMSC. Mahard recommends that the “United States adopt binding RUF 
for PCASP modelled on Norway’s Security Regulations” as “Norway has the most 
comprehensive and stringent RUF for PCASP”.256 
The Norwegian regulations reflect the industry norm requirements for armed guards. It is 
noteworthy that the requirement of prior warning before the use of force is codified as it creates 
an obligation on security personnel to only engage attackers as a last resort.  Abeyratne 
comments that “the fundamental premise of the Norwegian guidelines is that, in accordance with 
customary international law, the use of force is restricted to cases of necessity or self-
defence”.257  Dutton describes the guidelines on the use of force as “cautious in approach”.258 
It is thus safe to assume that Norwegian flag state authorisation for armed guards is trustworthy 
as details of the PMSC need to be supplied to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate prior to 
permission being granted.  Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities play an active role in the 
vessel’s “selection and employment of private contractors”.259  This could reduce the red tape for 
coastal states when permission is requested for the facilitation of security personnel in their 
territories because of the reliance on the flag state’s ability to scrutinise PMSC operating on 
vessels registered under its flag.  Whilst the Norwegian guidelines focus primarily on flag state 
authorisation for armed guards, the South African authorities could implement a policy whereby 
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Norwegian flagged vessels with proof of flag state authorisation could reduce red tape for vetting 
the PMSC, thereby ensuring efficient processing of permits.  This once again highlights the 
potential to increase the efficiency of the permit process of PCASP in coastal states with the 
cooperation of flag states. 
 
3.7 United Kingdom 
On 6 December 2012 the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport published the Interim 
Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed Guards to Defend against the Threat of 
Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances (UK Guidance). 
The UK Guidance was developed in response to the rapidly expanding maritime security 
industry. The Department for Transport recognised that “the use of armed guards, as an 
additional layer of protection on top of BMP, has been shown to be a very effective means of 
defending ships from pirate attack [sic]”.260  While welcomed by the maritime industry, it is 
argued that the UK Guidance requires further clarity on its application outside the HRA.261  As 
matters stand, United Kingdom (UK) flagged vessels are not allowed to carry armed guards off 
the Gulf of Guinea.  This is of concern given the increased attacks off the West Coast of 
Africa.262 
The UK Government confirmed that it did not recognise an accreditation process for PMSCs; 
however, it is the driving force behind the implementation of ISO 28007263 by PMSC.264  Barry 
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Roche, chief executive of PVI, noted with concern the UK Government’s failure to ratify 
guidelines in respect of the ISO accreditation standards as well as regulations governing the use 
of floating armouries.265 
The UK Guidance version 1.2 was published in May 2013. It includes express reference to ISO 
PAS 280074:2012 and “encourage[s] shipping companies to use independent third party 
certification to ISO 28000...as an important component of their criteria in selecting a PMSC”.266 
The obligation to conduct a due diligence and vetting of a PMSC falls on the ship owner.267  
Dutton notes that the UK policy requires owners to submit a “counter-piracy plan indicating why 
this extra level of protection, beyond following best management practices, is necessary”.268  The 
UK Guidance suggests that the following minimum criteria should be adhered to in selecting a 
PMSC: “adequate experience and training of personnel, appropriate insurance cover, and access 
to maritime legal advice at various jurisdictions, understanding of port state requirements for the 
movement of firearms and an understanding of BMP and United Kingdom firearms 
legislation”.269  It is important to note that the UK Guidance suggests that the PMSC should have 
undertaken police and employment background checks.270  This will once again reduce the 
individual personnel vetting procedure that needs to be undertaken by a coastal state like South 
Africa, should the appropriate mechanisms be in place in the flag state or country where the 
PMSC is registered.  The researcher is of the view that inter-state cooperation is essential to 
regulate the maritime security industry and to facilitate the movement of guards and weapons 
through various territories with as little hindrance as possible, always ensuring compliance with 
laws and procedures. 
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Section 6.9 of the UK Guidance states that: “it is essential that the laws of a coastal state are 
respected and complied with.”  The right of innocent passage of vessels does not outweigh a 
coastal state’s right to sovereignty, or the restriction of the right to acts which “are not prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of that state”.271  The UK Guidance expressly states that the 
“exercise or practice with weapons” in a member state’s territory would be prejudicial to the 
peace and security of that state.272 
For South Africa’s purposes, Section 6.12 requires that a PMSC seek clarification of a port 
state’s laws on firearms prior to the voyage.273  This would ensure that applications for weapons 
permits are submitted the moment the contract to provide armed protection for a transit is signed 
between owners and PMSC.274 
The UK Guidance states that rules on the use of force must be in place and agreed to by the 
shipowner;275 however, the guidance has been described as “cautious” as it advises that 
personnel should attempt to prevent unlawful boarding of a vessel “using the minimum force 
necessary”.276  The primary function of the PCASP “is to prevent illegal boarding of the vessel in 
order to protect the lives of those onboard, using the minimum force necessary to do so”.277  
Section 8.5 of the UK Guidance recommends that any conduct that shows capability of the use of 
lethal force (i.e., warning shots or showing weapons) must be done in a manner so as not to 
constitute an act of aggression.278  The mention of warning shots is noteworthy in both the 
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Norwegian and UK policies as no mention is made thereof in the Italian and Panamanian 
notices.279  
In the researcher’s view, the UK Guidance allows coastal states to utilise the provisions thereof 
for UK flagged vessels which allege ignorance of the coastal state’s laws prior to arrival.  There 
is an express obligation on the owner to ensure knowledge and compliance of a coastal state’s 
laws regulating the presence or movement of firearms in its territory, as with the Panamanian, 
Italian and Norwegian policies. 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION ON ARMED GUARDS 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyses the South African legislation governing the weapons permitting procedure, 
in particular, the Firearms Control Act (FCA)280 and the regulations281 thereunder.  Four cases 
heard in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban, are discussed and the problems encountered by 
PMSC in South Africa are highlighted with reference to the governing legislation and/or lack of 
consistent application thereof by the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
Reference will also be made to documents annexed to these court papers, including 
communiqués issued by the SAPS to the local shipping industry via the South African 
Association of Ship Owners (SAASOA) as well as other correspondence from the port authority 
which sought to clarify the policy on PCASP on board vessels entering a South African port. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion on the need to amend the Regulations to the FCA in 
order to facilitate the arming of vessels in South Africa for the purpose of self-defence against 
acts of sea piracy.  
 
4.2 South African legislation 
Legislation other than the FCA regulates the import and exportation of firearms and ammunition 
in South Africa.  The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended (C&E Act), “provides 
for... the prohibition and control of the importation, export, manufacture or use of certain goods; 
and for matters incidental thereto”282 to or from the Republic of South Africa.  This study refers 
to the C&E Act in respect of the interpretation of “transit” and “import” by the Appellate 
                                                          
280 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
281 Regulations to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
282 Preamble to the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended. 
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Division.  The remainder of the C&E Act is, however, not relevant to the primary focus of the 
study, namely the provisions of the FCA, and no further reference is made thereto. 
The National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 (NCACA) as amended, read with 
Government Gazette Notice No. 35272283 governs trade in “controlled items”284 in terms of 
which firearms as defined in the FCA are to remain regulated by the FCA and permits granted 
thereunder by the National Commissioner of Police.285  The notice indicates in the schedule that 
the key to determining the applicability of the FCA or NCACA permit procedures lies in 
identifying the types (and quantity)286 of the weapons in question.287  The schedule provides that 
“firearms” 288 and “ammunition”289 as defined in the FCA, which fall under the categories of 
Munitions List 1 (light weapons) and Munitions List 3 (ammunition and related items) are 
governed by the provisions of the FCA, when the “dealing” in those weapons is inter alia for 
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289 Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended: 
Section 1 (iii) “ammunition” means a primer or complete cartridge.  
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“use for private security”.290  Any use for “military purposes” (which is not defined) will be 
governed by the NCACA.291 
However, fully automatic firearms are prohibited firearms in terms of section 4(1)(a) of the FCA 
and they fall in the category of Munitions List 2 (heavy weapons).292  Possession of fully 
automatic firearms is regulated by section 4, namely, only for private or public collectors.  Thus 
any heavy weapons on board a merchant ship would be regulated in terms of the NCACA and 
permits obtained thereunder. 
The Dual Use Goods and Technologies list in the schedule regulates other items, such as body 
armour; the schedule indicates that only export of such goods is controlled under the NCACA.293  
Thus, the PCASP arriving with items listed thereunder would not need permission from the 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee. 
Against this background, the researcher is of the view that PCASP are not military personnel and 
their use of weapons falls within the meaning of “dealing for use for private security”; thus the 
permit procedure is governed by the FCA and Regulations thereunder. 
 
4.2.1 Requirements for a permit in terms of the Firearms Control Act 
Chapter 8 of the FCA and the Regulations thereto set out the requirements for the import, export 
and in-transit carriage of firearms to or from the Republic of South Africa.   
The import, export and/or in-transit carriage of firearms is prohibited unless the person is in 
possession of a permit issued in terms of the FCA.294  A permit authorising the import or transit 
of firearms constitutes a licence to possess the firearm295 which comes with certain rights and 
                                                          
290 Government Gazette Notice. 35272 Vol. 562 (20 April 2012), Republic of South Africa at 7. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid at 12. 
294 Section 73 
(1) No person may import into or export from South Africa any firearms or ammunition without an import or 
export permit issued in terms of this Act 
(2) No person may carry in transit through South Africa any firearms and ammunition without an in-transit 
permit issued in terms of this Act. 
295 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Section 77 (1).  
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obligations.296  A foreigner who holds an import permit is thus entitled to possess such firearms 
listed on the permit in South African territory, as if he/she holds a firearms licence issued to 
South African citizens or residence permit holders. 
Section 14 of the FCA states that semi-automatic rifles and shotguns are “restricted firearms” for 
the purpose of licensing and licenses will only be issued to natural persons demonstrating the 
need to possess such firearm.297  However, this applies to licence applications and not permit 
applications.  A licence issued under the provisions of the FCA is distinguished from a permit 
issued in terms of Section 74 of the FCA.298  It is the duty of persons wanting to import, export, 
possess, manufacture and/or otherwise trade in firearms to apply for “the appropriate permits 
from the relevant authorities.”299  The onus therefore rests on persons who intend, for example, 
to import weapons that are on board a merchant vessel for the purpose of providing protection 
against acts of sea piracy, namely, PCASP to ensure that the correct permits are obtained. 
 
 
                                                          
296 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Section 77(2); as imposed by the Registrar on the permit. 
297 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended: 
Section 14. 
(1) For purposes of this Act, a restricted firearm is any - 
(a) semi-automatic rifle or shotgun, which cannot readily be converted into a fully automatic firearm; or 
(b) firearm declared by the Minister, by notice in the Gazette, to be a restricted firearm... 
(4) The Registrar may issue a licence in terms of this section to any natural person who shows that a firearm 
contemplated in section 13(1) will not provide sufficient protection, and who submits reasonable 
information to motivate the need for a restricted firearm for self-defence purposes. 
298 See for example Regulation 62 (4) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, which states: 
Non-resident: Temporary import and export permit of a firearm not licensed in terms of the Act  
(a) An application by a person who is a non-resident and not the holder of a permanent resident permit for a 
temporary import permit and the subsequent export permit or multiple import and export permit in respect 
of any firearm or ammunition not licensed under the Act, may be submitted either to the Head: Central 
Firearms Register directly or to the Designated Firearms Officer at the place designated as a port of entry 
in terms of the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002) where the applicant will enter into the 
Republic of South Africa. 
See also the distinction between Chapter 6 headed “LICENCE TO POSSESS FIREARM” and Section 77 which 
states:   
(1) A permit for the import of a firearm or ammunition also constitutes a licence to possess such firearm or 
ammunition for such person and period as the Registrar may specify on the permit. 
It is thus clear that the legislature intended to distinguish between a licence to possess a firearm and a permit for the 
purpose of import, export or carriage in-transit in the Republic of South Africa.  See also the argument raised by the 
applicant in the Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal 
High Court, Durban Case No. 35/2012 – Applicant’s Main Heads of Argument at para. 3(e) and further argued by 
the researcher below in section 4.2.2. 
299 Government Gazette Notice. 35272 Vol. 562 (20 April 2012), Republic of South Africa Item 4 at 1. 
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4.2.2 Who must apply for a permit? 
Any PCASP intending to enter South African territory with firearms and ammunition must apply 
for a permit to possess same and must be “a fit and proper person to hold such permit”.300  The 
South African authorities have interpreted this as meaning that an applicant for a permit must 
possess a competency certificate issued in terms of the Act.301  
This interpretation was disputed by the applicant in the Solace Global case, on the basis that the 
requirement of a competency certificate does not extend to permit applications.302  Section 6(2) 
of the FCA provides that no licence may be issued to a person who is not in possession of a 
competency certificate.303  The applicant argued that the wording of this section does not 
mention “permit” and that a reasonable interpretation would suggest that competency certificates 
are limited to an application for a firearms licence. 
The FCA also restricts the issuing of competency certificates to South African citizens and 
residence permit holders.304  In most cases, applicants for firearms import permits for the purpose 
of providing armed protection to merchant vessels are foreign citizens or companies registered 
outside the Republic of South Africa.  However, industry practice in South Africa is for a local 
agent to be appointed by the foreign PMSC to apply for permits on its behalf - to be named as the 
‘holder’ on the said permit.  This is further examined in sections 4.4 and 4.6 in the discussion on 
unreported South African cases, namely the Protection Vessels International (PVI)305 and Solace 
Global cases. 
The researcher is of the opinion that the interpretation of section 6(2) of the FCA adopted by the 
South African authorities in the Solace Global case was incorrect; a more proper interpretation is 
                                                          
300 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Section 74(1). 
301 Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case No. 35/2012 at para 13.1 of the Respondent’s Answering Affidavit (p. 130 of the indexed bundle) (the 
Solace Global case). 
302 Ibid Applicant’s Main Heads of Argument at para. 3(e). 
303 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended,  
Section 6(2):  Subject to section 7, no licence may be issued to a person who is not in possession of the 
relevant competency certificate. 
304 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, Section 9: 
(2) Where a person has not previously obtained a competency , a competency certificate may only be issued 
to such person if he or she- 
(b) is a South African citizen or a holder of a permanent South African residence permit.  
305 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (unreported), KwaZulu-Natal 
High Court, Durban, Republic of South Africa Case No. 3390/2011 (PVI case). 
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that an applicant for an import and/or in-transit permit need not be in possession of a competency 
certificate.306 
Therefore the only requirement for the issue of a firearms permit to a PCASP is that the applicant 
be a “fit and proper person” in terms of section 74(1) of the FCA.  The term is not presently 
defined in the Act. 
A definition of a “fit and proper person” has been included in the amendments to the FCA 
assented to on 17 February 2007 but it has not come into force and is awaiting proclamation by 
the President of the Republic of South Africa.307  The proposed definition will pose problems for 
PCASP.  The amendments include the insertion of paragraph (g) in Section 1:- 
(g) ‘fit and proper person’ means a person who complies with the requirements of section 9 
(2) and any regulations relevant to the competency of a person to possess a firearm in 
terms of this act. 
 
The amendment therefore seeks to bring the definition of a “fit and proper person” within the 
requirements for persons entitled to be in possession of a competency certificate as set out in 
Section 9(2) of the FCA.  A reasonable interpretation of the proposed definition would be that 
foreign applicants for permits would need to ensure that they comply with the remainder of the 
requirements under Section 9(2), apart from citizenship and South African residence obligations.  
The researcher is of the view that if such an interpretation is not adopted a foreign applicant will 
never be in a position to bring themselves within the ambit of the definition of a “fit and proper 
person”308 because they would fall short of the requirements of section 9(2) (b).309  This cannot 
be the intention of the legislature as the Regulations to the FCA elsewhere expressly contemplate 
that permits will be issued to foreign persons (non-citizens and non-residents).310  However, if 
foreign applicants need to generally comply with the requirements of Section 9(2) of the FCA in 
                                                          
306 Justice Gorvin did not hand down a written judgment on this issue nor was it part of the order granted on 18 June 
2012 in the Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High 
Court, Durban Case No. 35/2012. 
307 Firearms Control Amendment Act 28 of 2006, assented to on 17 August 2007 updated to Government Gazette 
35047 dated 17 February, 2012 (Amendment Act). 
308 In terms of the Firearms Control Amendment Act 28 of 2006, assented to on 17 August 2007 updated to 
Government Gazette 35047 dated 17 February, 2012. 
309 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
310 Regulation 62 (4) and (7) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
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order to be considered a “fit and proper person”, excluding the specific requirements of 
citizenship or residence, this would appear to make sense: a foreign applicant must then show 
that he/she is of stable mental condition, is not inclined to violence,311 does not have a criminal 
record for offences including the handling of firearms312, use and/or dealing and/or possession of 
intoxicating drugs313, or domestic and sexual violence314 and has not been declared unfit to 
possess a firearm315 in order to be considered a “fit and proper person”.  The researcher is of the 
view that these are onerous requirements for foreign PCASP where the intention should be to 
increase the efficiency of the permit process; hence, the legislation does not specifically cater for 
this category of persons intending to enter South African territory with firearms and ammunition. 
A PMSC is usually a juristic person and the researcher will illustrate how the SAPS have partly 
applied the provisions of the FCA in some cases.  Regulation 13(5) sets out the requirements for 
applicants who are juristic persons.  Included in this regulation is the requirement that “proof of 
registration or incorporation in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa be 
submitted”.316  A strict interpretation of regulation 13(5) suggests that only South African 
registered companies can apply for permits and not PMSC registered outside the Republic.  
Foreign PMSC are the owners of the weapons and PCASP are employees/contractors of the 
security firms contracted to provide protection for vessels, cargo and crew transiting the HRA. 
The question that arises is whether foreign PMSCs must appoint a South African person or 
company to act as their agent for the purpose of the permit application. 
This was the procedure adopted by Protection Vessels International (PVI)317 and Solace 
Global.318  The researcher is of the view that a strict interpretation of the legislation in these 
                                                          
311 Ibid Section (9) (2) (d). 
312 Ibid Section (9) (2) (g). 
313 Ibid Section (9) (2) (j) and (k). 
314 Ibid Section (9) (2) (h) (ii). 
315 Ibid Section (9) (2) (p). 
316 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended,  
Regulation (13)(5) When the applicant is a juristic person –  
(b) the applications must be accompanied by proof of the registration or incorporation, as the case may 
be, of the juristic person in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa. 
317 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (unreported), KwaZulu-Natal 
High Court, Durban, Republic of South Africa Case No. 3390/2011 Applicant’s founding affidavit at para. 11.  The 
representative for PVI confirmed that they appointed OPS Solutions CC trading as OPS Maritime Security Services 




circumstances suggests that the ‘applicant’ for the permit is not the non-resident PMSC but the 
local South African company.  The South African company is the entity making the application 
for the permit and is nominated by the PMSC.  It is the South African agent who is named the 
holder of the permit.  This interpretation could affect the entire permit procedure because there 
are different requirements for non-resident applicants (foreign companies or persons) and South 
African citizens or registered companies.  The requirements differ substantially and can impact 
the permit application process. 
 
4.2.3 Regulations to the Firearms Control Act 
The regulations require careful analysis as there are several applicable provisions, which are not 
always clear, and sometimes contradictory.  In navigating the regulations the following issues 
should be considered: 
1. What type of permit must be applied for? 
2. Who must the application be made to?   
3. What conditions do the Regulations set to govern the application? 
 
The Regulations to the FCA set the requirements for an application for an “import” permit and 
an “in-transit” permit. 
“Import” is not defined in the Act but a definition can be found in the Regulations as follows: 
“import” – in relation to firearms or ammunition means to bring them, or cause them to be 
brought, from outside the Republic of South Africa into the Republic of South Africa and 
includes the bringing thereof into the Republic of South Africa at any harbour or airport or other 
place on board any vessel or aircraft or other means of conveyance, irrespective of whether or not 
the firearms or ammunition are off-loaded from such vessel or aircraft or other means of 
conveyance for conveyance through the Republic of South Africa to any place outside the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
318 Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case No. 35/2012 at para 10 of the Applicant’s founding affidavit (page 9 of the indexed bundle). 
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Republic of South Africa or for any other purpose, or are intended to be so off-loaded; and 
‘import’, when used as a verb, shall have a corresponding meaning. 319 
“In-transit” is defined in the Regulations as: 
the conveyance through the Republic of South Africa to another country of firearms or 
ammunition that has been imported.320 
The presence of PCASP with weapons on board merchant vessels entering South African ports 
appears to fall within the definition of “import”, regardless of whether or not the firearms and 
ammunition are intended to be discharged.  A definition of “export” is not provided in the FCA 
or the Regulations. 
There is no case law in South Africa where the terms “import” and “in transit” have been 
considered in terms of firearms legislation.  However, the Appellate Division (as it then was) 
distinguished between the words ‘transit’ and ‘import’ in respect of Section 18 of the C&E 
Act321 in the case of Tieber v Commissioner for Customs and Excise.322  It can be argued that the 
word “import” should be narrowly defined when one considers the dictum below: 
It appears clearly that its main purpose is to ensure that customs and excise duties are paid on all 
goods which are brought into the Republic [imported] other than goods only in transit, i.e. goods 
which are landed in this country but destined for conveyance to another country.  For that reason, 
one sees in S 18 that elaborate provision is made for the removal of goods in bond.  Where 
bonded goods in fact leave the common customs area, which includes the Republic, no duties are 
payable.323 
Thus goods are “imported” if they are landed in South Africa and are not “in transit”.  It is 
suggested that a reasonable interpretation of “in-transit” would be restricted to situations where 
firearms are consigned to a final destination state, other than the Republic of South Africa – most 
probably to an inland African country.  Thus, where goods are “in-transit” they are transported, 
by road, rail or possibly air, through South African territory with the intention of being imported 
into another state. 
                                                          
319 Regulations to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, Regulation 1. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended. 
322 1992 (4) SA 844.  
323 1992 (4) SA at 849.   
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The definition of “in-transit” in the FCA Regulations is, however, ambiguous as it concludes 
with “that has been imported”.  This may be interpreted to mean that all in-transit weapons are in 
fact also imported.  The legislature surely did not intend that in-transit firearms destined for 
another state should be permitted under both the “import” and “in-transit” regulations.  The 
researcher is of the view that although contradictory in the definitions, there is a clear distinction 
between “import” and “in-transit” firearms permits. 
The definition of “in transit” refers to “the conveyance [of the firearms] through the Republic of 
South Africa to another country”, but this does not address the ambiguity.  The word “convey” is 
also used in the NCACA where it is defined in Section 1 as: 
in relation to controlled items, means to transport controlled items through or over the territory of 
the Republic, its territorial waters or its airspace to any other place or destination outside the 
Republic, whether or not such controlled items are off-loaded.324 
Thus goods could be “conveyed” when they are intended to be landed for transport to a 
neighbouring African country, but could also be “conveyed” when they pass through South 
Africa’s territorial waters while remaining on board a vessel that is calling at a South African 
port, because they are still en route to a final destination.  Applying this broader meaning to 
weapons used by PCASP might be difficult as the goods are not being conveyed to any particular 
final destination.  For this reason, the researcher suggests that the “in transit” definition does not 
apply to such weapons under these circumstances. 
The researcher is of the view that such weapons require an “import” permit.  This could cover 
weapons that remain in storage on board a vessel as the definition of “import” in the FCA 
Regulations expressly includes circumstances where firearms are not off-loaded from the vessel. 
The ability to distinguish between goods in transit and goods that have been imported is not 
purely trivial.  The requirements for an “in-transit” and “import” firearms permit in the 
Regulations to the FCA differ substantially.  It is impossible for a PCASP to comply with the 
requirements for both an “import” and “in transit” permit for the same shipment, and an 
interpretation of the term “in transit” which overlaps with that of “import” leads to an absurdity. 
                                                          
324 Section 1 of the National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002, as amended. 
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Regulations 61 and 63 read with Regulation 13 to the FCA set the conditions and requirements 
for an “in-transit” permit.  An “in-transit permit” applicant must provide proof of authority to 
import the firearms to the country of final destination325 and must supply details of the route to 
be taken, including the mode of transport.326  The applicant must also produce a consignment 
note for the weapons that he/she is intending to transit through South Africa.327 
It is not feasible for a PMSC, PCASP team and/or vessel owner to comply with the requirements 
for an “in transit” permit as it is common practice that weapons are exported from a country of 
origin with the intention of circulating amongst numerous teams and coastal states over an 
extended period of time with no pre-determined final destination in mind.  The weapons will be 
disembarked in a country after a specific transit and this is not necessarily the “final destination”.  
PMSC generally try to ensure that weapons are discharged at a specific port after completion of a 
transit through the HRA, ready to be loaded on board the next vessel sailing from that particular 
port.  This minimises the cost of the repatriation of team members, including the weapons.  For 
example, ports in Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Djibouti are used as “hub points” for PCASP teams 
where personnel disembark from one vessel and embark on the next vessel with whom the 
PMSC has a contract to provide protection.328 
Nevertheless, since those terms in the FCA have not been interpreted by South African courts the 
ambiguity remains and has the potential to confuse applicants seeking to obtain the correct 
documentation to legally allow a PCASP team to arrive in South Africa.  This will be illustrated 
in the mv “Roelof”329 case discussed in section 4.3.3. 
                                                          
325 Regulations to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, Reg. 61(b). 
326 Ibid Reg. 61(c). 
327 Ibid Reg. 63 (g). 
328 James Brown ‘Pirates and Privateers:  Managing the Indian Oceans’ Maritime Security Boom’ at 7 (12 
September 2012) Lowy Institute for International Policy available at  
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/pirates-and-privateers-managing-indian-oceans-private-security-boom - 
accessed on 16 November 2013.  See also Florquin, N. ‘Escalation at Sea: Somali Piracy and Private Security 
Companies’ in Project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies ‘Small Arms Survey 2012: 
Moving Targets’: Geneva, Cambridge 2012 at 207-210.  
329 Ralph van Urk – The owner of the mv “Roelof” v Minister of Police and Another (unreported), KwaZulu-Natal 
High Court, Durban Case number 10610/2011 (the mv “Roelof” case). 
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The requirements for an “import” permit are dealt with in section 4.2.8.  It should be noted that 
whilst problems arise in applying the import requirements to a PCASP team, it is submitted that 
it is the correct permit to apply for in accordance with the FCA and Regulations. 
The fact that these “hub points” have the potential to persuade vessel owners to change their 
sailing schedule, for example, to call at the port of Salalah, Oman to take on bunkers and guards 
simultaneously in place of an alternative port, should be an incentive for coastal states to ensure 
that administrative requirements for permits for armed guards are clear and not unduly onerous.  
This will be discussed in the conclusion to this study and is one of the reasons that the researcher 
argues that South Africa should consider amending the current legislation applicable to armed 
guards. 
 
4.2.4 Conditions for non-resident import permit applicants  
As noted above, it is argued that the correct permit is an “import permit”.  Regulation 62 of the 
FCA330 sets out the conditions in respect of applications for import and export permits.  Any 
reference made to import will include the word “export” for the purpose of this study as the 
nature of PCASP permit applications will involve importing to and re-exporting from South 
Africa.  For this category of persons, the intention is not for the weapons to remain indefinitely 
in South Africa but rather to move freely between vessel transits around the South African 
coastline. 
Specific prescribed conditions for “non-resident applicants” are set out in Regulation 62(4).  
These conditions should be read in addition to those set out in Regulation 13, which are the 
general requirements for permits, amongst others. 
The word “person” is used when referring to non-resident applicants.  Regulation 13(5) sets 
requirements for juristic persons who apply for a permit under the FCA.  Juristic person 
applicants are expressly limited to South African companies.331  If this is the case the import 
                                                          
330 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
331 Regulation 13(5)(b) to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
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permit requirements for South African companies, if nominated by a foreign PMSC, are to be 
applied and not necessarily the “non-resident” requirements.  
On the other hand, where PMSCs are the applicants, South African agents would be nominated 
as the “responsible persons” when making application on the prescribed SAPS520 form.332  In 
other words, a foreign juristic person cannot qualify as an applicant within the meaning of the 
Regulation 13(5) of the FCA. 
Thus the SAPS have applied the Regulations to the FCA in a piecemeal fashion in order to issue 
permits and to accommodate PMSC by applying the requirements under Regulation 62(4) for 
non-resident applicants and incorporating the segments of Regulation 13(5) for juristic persons 
but excluding the requirement of the juristic person being a South African registered company in 
terms of Regulation 13(5) (b).333  The researcher analyses the remainder of the applicable FCA 
Regulations on the assumption that foreign PMSCs fall within the meaning of “non-resident 
applicants” in terms of Regulation 62(4), but that this is an area that requires clarification by way 
of amendments to the regulations. 
 
4.2.5 Types of import permits 
There are two types of import permits under Regulation 62(2), namely; (i) temporary permits and 
(ii) multiple import/export permits.  Non-residents are entitled to apply for a temporary or 
multiple import and export permit.334 
The word “temporary” is not defined in the FCA or the Regulations thereto.  The definition of 
“multiple”335 expressly includes the repeated import and export of weapons permitted under the 
                                                          
332 The SAPS520 is the generic form wherein details of an application for an import/export permit are completed and 
submitted to the SAPS.  A copy of the SAPS520 is available at 
http://www.saps.gov.za/services/flash/firearms/downloads/import_application.pdf. 
333 For example, in the both the Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police and others (unreported) 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case No. 35/2012 and Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety 
and Security and Others (unreported), KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban, Republic of South Africa Case No. 
3390/2011 applications were made on behalf of foreign juristic companies – as applicants - but the holders of the 
permits were named as local South African agents. 
334 The Regulation is headed: 
 Non-resident:  Temporary import and export permit of a firearm not licensed in terms of the Act.  
Regulation 62(4)(a) states: An application by a person who is a non-resident and not the holder of a 
permanent resident permit for a temporary import permit and the subsequent export permit or multiple 
import and export permit... 
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Act.  In the researcher’s view, a reasonable interpretation of “temporary” includes circumstances 
where the firearms and ammunition are permitted to enter (or exit) the Republic on one specific 
occasion as a result of a single event requiring the presence of such firearms.336 
The researcher will illustrate that should PMSC choose South Africa as the next hub point, a 
multiple import/export permit is the most appropriate authorisation for commercial and 
efficiency reasons.  PMSCs seek to increase productivity and reduce costs for their shipowner 
clients with quick turn-around times.  This can only occur with the free movement of weapons in 
and out of South Africa, correctly documented and controlled, to ensure that maritime trade is 
not delayed or hindered by unduly onerous requirements, or inconsistencies, in the permit 
application process. 
 
4.2.6 To whom must a permit application be submitted? 
The application for both a temporary and multiple337 import permit can either be submitted to; (i) 
the Registrar at the Central Firearms Registry (CFR) or (ii) the Designated Firearms Officer 
(DFO) at the port of entry. 
Regulation 62 (4) Non-resident: Temporary import and export permit of a firearm not licensed in 
terms of the Act  
(a) An application by a person who is a non-resident and not the holder of a permanent resident 
permit for a temporary import permit and the subsequent export permit or multiple import 
and export permit in respect of any firearm or ammunition not licensed under the Act, may 
be submitted either to the Head: Central Firearms Register directly or to the Designated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
335 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended,   
Regulation 1:  
“multiple import-export permit” means an import and export permit authorizing the multiple import and export 
of a specific firearm or ammunition during a specified period. Regulation 62 (6) - Multiple import export 
permit: 
(a) The Registrar, Designated Firearms Officer or a police official who has been delegated thereto, may issue 
an import permit and export permit in respect of a specific firearm and also ammunition applicable to the 
firearm, which permit will allow the repeated import and export of the firearm and ammunition over a fixed 
period of time which permit will be known as a “multiple import-export permit”. 
336 Temporary is defined as: “lasting for only a limited period of time; not permanent” – Oxford Dictionaries 
available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/temporary?q=temporary accessed on 14 
November 2013. 
337 Regulation 62 (5) to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
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Firearms Officer at the place designated as a port of entry in terms of the Immigration Act, 
2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002) where the applicant will enter into the Republic of South 
Africa.338 
 
An applicant is required to submit an application at least 21 days prior to his or her arrival, but 
only if the application is made directly to the CFR. 
 Regulation 62(4)(b): 
An application submitted directly to the Head: Central Firearms Register in terms of 
subparagraph (a) must be lodged at least 21 days prior to the arrival of the applicant in the 
Republic of South Africa and the applicant must supply an address outside the borders of the 
Republic of South Africa whereto the permit will be posted.339 
 
The question of whom an application can be made to is important in analysing the South African 
police authorities’ interpretation of the FCA and the procedures for permit applications.  For 
example, on 16 September 2010, the SAPS instructed relevant stakeholders that all permit 
applications (for PMSCs) must be made at least 21 days prior to the vessel’s arrival,340 whether 
the application is made to the CFR or the local DFO. 
A strict reading of Regulation 62(4)(c) suggests that a person who possesses a firearm and 
intends entering South Africa, can apply directly to the DFO for either a temporary or a multiple 
import permit on arrival at the port of entry, provided that all the necessary documentation is in 
order and the DFO is delegated to issue permits. 
Regulation 62(4) (c) states: 
The permit in respect of an application submitted to the Designated Firearms Officer on the 
arrival of the applicant at the port of entry… may be issued by the Designated Firearms Officer 
                                                          
338 Regulation 62 (4) to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
339 Regulation 62(4) (b) to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended.  
340 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing a mechanism to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private armed security agencies to protect vessels from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ 
– SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban Harbour addressed to the SAASOA 
Durban Chapter Chairperson, 16 September 2010, (Ref: 3/5/1) and annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 1.  
Solace Global Maritime UK Ltd v Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban 




who receives the application only if the Designated Firearms Officer concerned is delegated 
thereto.341 
Several questions arise regarding the interpretation and application of Regulation 62(4) (c), the 
first being whether it is available to PCSAP at all.  The following questions need to be addressed: 
1. Considering the plain wording of the regulation, do the provisions of Regulation 62(4) (c) 
apply to PCASP? 
2. If a PCASP team arrives in South Africa without a permit, intending to apply under 
Regulation 62(4) (c), but the vessel is immediately searched on entry to the port, can the 
personnel be arrested and prosecuted for unlawful possession of firearms?  How would 
this impact on a permit application made after such arrest? 
3. When Regulation 62(4) (c) is read with Regulation 62(7) (f), there is an apparent 
contradiction. How is this to be resolved in the case of applications by PCASP? 
The wording of Regulation 62(4) (c) is unambiguous in its reference to the submission of the 
permit application “on the arrival of the applicant at the port of entry”.  Provided the DFO is 
delegated to issue permits at the port of entry and the members of the PCASP team are 
“applicants”, Regulation 62(4) (c) prima facie allows armed guards (or any other applicant for 
that matter) to arrive in a South African port and apply for a permit on disembarkation.  At OR 
Tambo International Airport, there is a specialised SAPS Office tasked with receiving 
applications for and issuing temporary firearms import permits for foreign persons arriving in 
South African territory.342  This correlates with the provisions of Regulation 62(4) (c) and it is 
the researcher’s view that it would apply to armed guards or PMSCs intending to obtain permits 
on arrival at a South African port of entry, in particular, Durban Harbour.   
On the other hand, Regulation 62(7) limits the categories of persons who may be issued with an 
import permit without prior approval from the Registrar.  
Regulation 62(7) states: 
                                                          
341 Regulation 62(4) (c) to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
342 South African Airways Firearms Declaration Procedure – Available at 
http://www.flysaa.com/za/en/flyingSAA/baggage/firearms.html  accessed on 12 November 2013. 
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Conditions under which a temporary import permit may be issued 
A temporary import permit may only be issued - 
(a) to a foreign visitor for the purpose of hunting; 
(b) to a foreign visitor to display the firearm and ammunition at a trade show or collectors’ show, 
or to display firearms or ammunition at a sport or hunting trade show; 
(c) to a foreign visitor to participate in a competitive sports shooting event organised by 
recognised business, hunting, sports-shooting or collectors' organisation; 
(d) to an official of a foreign government or a distinguished foreign visitor so designated by the 
South African Department of Foreign Affairs; 
(e) to a foreign law enforcement officer entering the Republic of South Africa on an officially 
approved policing assignment; or 
(f) to a person who, for other legitimate reasons, has received the prior approval from the 
Registrar and where the applicant can demonstrate:- 
(i) the lawful possession of the firearm; 
(ii) knowledge of the safe handling and use of the firearm in question through possession 
of a licence for the firearm or through past experience; 
(iii) knowledge of the South African laws relating to firearms, including the principles 
relating to the use, safe storage and handling of firearms and where applicable their 
public display; 
(iv) a need to possess the firearm; 
(v) that the applicant cannot reasonably satisfy that need by means other than the 
possession of a firearm; and 
(vi) that he or she is at least 21 years old: Provided that the Registrar may, within his or 
her sole discretion and on good cause shown, exempt an applicant from this requirement. 
 
Thus, PCASP do not fall within the categories listed in (a) to (e) above but qualify, in the 
researcher’s view, as “a person who, for other legitimate reasons, has received the prior approval 
from the Registrar...”   It therefore appears that prior approval from the Registrar is required 
prior to a PMSC submitting a temporary or multiple import permit application.  No time limits or 
conditions are set for the prior approval; in the researcher’s view, this creates uncertainty for 
PMSC intending to disembark PCASP teams in South African territory. 
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The second issue involves circumstances where a vessel is searched by the SAPS immediately 
after berthing, or whilst at anchorage within South African territorial waters and weapons are 
found on board.  Any person who is in possession of weapons in South African territory without 
a permit is in contravention of the FCA and risks being arrested and prosecuted.343 
The question that may then be asked is whether is it permissible for a Master who has been 
arrested for unlawful possession of firearms to argue that he or she intended applying for a 
temporary/multiple import permit in terms of Regulation 62(4) (c) as soon as the vessel berthed.  
One certainly has grounds to challenge the arrest and/or prosecution on the basis that one 
intended applying for a permit on arrival at the port of entry in accordance with Regulation 62 
(4)(c).  Furthermore, one could ask whether the Master’s defence would be strengthened by 
producing a written instruction/advice from the owners or an attorney stating that the application 
can be made on arrival at the port in terms of the subsection. 
Finally, one must consider what the situation would be where the responsible person344 continues 
with the permit application despite the arrest of the Master, and the permit is duly issued by the 
relevant DFO.345  The authorised DFO must consider the application before the person can be 
detained and charged for unlawful possession of firearms.  The concern is that a permit might be 
refused on the grounds that the person has already been arrested for unlawful possession with a 
pending criminal charge.346  It is suggested that in such circumstances this decision would be 
subject to review in terms of PAJA.347 
                                                          
343 Section 73 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, prohibits the importation of weapons without a 
permit. 
344 A responsible person is someone who has been authorized to make an application on behalf of a juristic person, 
in terms of Regulation 13(5) (a) of the FCA.  
345 This is not unrealistic as was demonstrated in the Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police and 
others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case No. 35/2012 at para. 8 – 9 of the Applicant’s 
Replying Affidavit (in re: David John Peach) page 154 of the indexed bundle.  The applicant’s South African agents 
applied for, and were granted, a multiple import-export permit for firearms and ammunition that were in fact in the 
SAPS’ possession at the time of such application as they formed part of an investigation into possible violations of 
the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
346 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (unreported), KwaZulu-Natal 
High Court, Durban, Republic of South Africa Case No. 3390/2011 at para. 8 - 10 of the affidavit of Derick John 
Coetzee annexed to the applicant’s founding affidavit wherein mention is made of the refusal of the DFO for Durban 
to renew an import permit on the basis of the deponent’s pending criminal charge. 
347 Section 6 (Judicial review of Administrative Act) - Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.  This 
refusal would fall under the definition of an Administrative Action in terms of Section 1. 
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If the person is arrested and an application for a temporary or multiple import permit is granted 
after the arrest, there is also uncertainty as to whether the National Prosecuting Authority may 
still prosecute for unlawful possession.  It is important for a state to protect its national security 
and this may be compromised if the Regulations to the FCA permit ex-military trained and 
armed personnel to simply arrive in South African ports carrying semi-automatic weapons and 
demanding the right to apply for a permit on arrival (without prior notification). 
What is important is that there is clarity on this issue and that concise requirements are published 
with reasonable, prescribed conditions that cater for the unique situation of armed guards on 
board merchant vessels. 
 
4.2.7 Delegated designated firearms officer (DFO) 
The DFO must be delegated to accept applications and issue import permits in order for 
Regulation 62(4)(c) to be utilised.  The term “delegated” is not defined in the FCA nor the 
regulations thereto; however, the Registrar has an obligation in terms of Section 124(1)(h)348 to 
“designate police officials as designated firearms officers”. 
The Registrar may delegate the powers conferred upon him or her to any official in the service of 
the state.349  It is thus open for an applicant to argue that when a DFO accepts applications, and 
issues and signs permits in his or her own name, he or she can reasonably be held to be delegated 
in terms of Section 141(1) of the FCA as he or she is performing a power conferred on him or 
her by the Registrar. 
The SAPS have insisted that all applications for import and export permits must be submitted to 
the CFR or “SAPS National Office” 21 days prior to a vessel or persons arrival without, in the 
researcher’s view, considering Regulation 62(4)(c).350 
                                                          
348 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
349 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Section 141(1). 
350 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ - 
SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban Harbour addressed to SAASOA Durban 
Chapter Chairperson, 28 February 2011, (Ref: 3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 3. Protection 
Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case 
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There has been no formal written communication from the SAPS stating that the DFO, for 
example, at Durban Central Police Station which has jurisdiction over the port of Durban, is not 
delegated to issue such permits.  Captain Vishnu Pillay, in his capacity as the DFO for Durban 
Central Police Station, has issued import and export permits for foreign PMSC.351 
 
4.2.8 Conditions for import firearms permit 
When applying for an import permit the following should be considered:  
1. Who may apply?  
2. What conditions must the applicant satisfy and is prior approval necessary?   
A temporary or multiple import permit may only be issued to certain persons intending to enter 
South Africa.352  These persons are limited to hunters,353 collectors attending a trade and/or 
collectors’ show,354 sport shooters,355 foreign government officials,356 foreign law enforcement 
personnel357 and for any other legitimate reason.358  It is clear that PCASP applicants would fall 
into the ‘catch all’ category of “for any other legitimate reason”.  The researcher argues in the 
conclusion to this study that this is one of the main areas of the Regulations that require 
amendment in order to accommodate PCASP by removing the stringent requirements that are 
presently not applicable to hunters, collectors, sport shooters and foreign government officials 
but are applicable to PCASP. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Number 3390/2011, annexed to the replying affidavit of Mark Andrew Wilson (see paragraph 4.6) marked 
“MAW9”. 
351 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (unreported), KwaZulu-Natal 
High Court, Durban, Republic of South Africa Case No. 3390/2011.   Confirmatory Affidavit of Derek Coetzee at 
para. 18, annexed to the Applicant’s founding affidavit.  See also Solace Global Maritime UK Ltd v Minister of 
Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case No. 35/2012 where Captain Pillay issued 
and renewed multiple import and export firearms permits. 
352 Regulation 62(7) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
353 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (a).  
354 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (b). 
355 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (c).  
356 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (d). 
357 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (e). 
358 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f). 
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Applicants who fall under the catch-all category have to comply with a more rigorous set of 
requirements than hunters, sports shooters, persons attending a trade show and foreign 
government officials.  They need to demonstrate lawful possession of the weapons,359 knowledge 
and vast experience in the use of the weapons,360 understanding of the FCA,361 a need to possess 
the weapon,362 that the applicant cannot satisfy this need without a weapon363 and that the 
applicant is older than 21.364 
Due to the expertise and training of PCASP, the above requirements do not seem to pose a 
problem, except for the age restriction which might hinder personnel under the age of 21 from 
being able to possess weapons in South African territory. 
However, the applicants under the catch-all category must also comply with the prior approval 
requirement.  Consideration of this requirement involves determining who can grant approval, 
what the required notice period is and whether such requirements can be met by ship owners and 
PCASPs. 
The prior approval requirement is set out in Regulation 62(7) (f): 
 A temporary import permit may only be issued: – 
to a person who, for other legitimate reasons, has received the prior approval from the Registrar 
and where the applicant can demonstrate… 
This appears, prima facie, to mean that a vessel owner or PCASP team needs to obtain prior 
authorisation from the Registrar before making a formal application for an import permit.  In 
other words, an application for a permit under the “catch all”365 category is, in the researcher’s 
view, a two-step process; (i) prior approval must be obtained from the Registrar, and, (ii) 
thereafter the required documentation for the processing of a permit application must be 
submitted either to the CFR or DFO at the port of entry. 
                                                          
359 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f) (i). 
360 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f) (ii). 
361 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f) (iii). 
362 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f) (iv). 
363 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f) (v).  
364 Ibid Regulation 62(7) (f) (vi). 
365 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Regulation 62(7) (f). 
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The researcher is of the view that the “prior approval” requirement in Regulation 62(7)(f) is not 
expressly subject to the 21 day rule requirement set out in Regulation 62(4)(b).  Unless both 
regulations must be read together, it is possible to argue that in terms of Regulation 62(7)(f), a 
PMSC may apply for general or “blanket” prior approval from the CFR, and may thereafter 
make individual applications for import permits to the DFO on arrival at the port of entry, in 
terms of Regulation 62(4)(c).  The researcher recommends that the South African authorities 
develop a list of approved PMSCs similar to the Panamanian Maritime Authority’s approach 
discussed in Chapter Three, section 4 whereby prior approval is not required for certain 
companies that have already been vetted.366  This would reduce unnecessary delays in the permit 
processing procedure and improve efficiency for PMSCs.  The Mauritian policy expressly states 
that authorisation must be obtained from the Prime Minister’s office to operate in territorial 
waters and thereafter, 48 hours’ notice of arrival by a PCASP team on board a merchant vessel 
(with necessary details of equipment and personnel) is required.367  The South African authorities 
should use the Mauritian procedures as a model for the development of a new policy regarding 
PCASP subject to their own security assessment. 
It is submitted that this is desirable as it reduces administrative requirements by allowing the 
CFR to vet a PMSC once, and then allow future permit applications for a PCASP team arriving 
in South Africa to be submitted directly to the DFO on reasonable short notice.  Alternatively, 
the PMSC can submit the documentation set out in the Regulation for each and every employee 
who may possibly enter South Africa in the near future.  This does not seem sensible and will, in 
the researcher’s view, add to the already backlogged CFR. 
As permits are not granted in the individual security personnel’s name but to the PMSC firm and 
the South African agent is nominated as the “responsible person”, it is submitted that it is not 
                                                          
366 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Authorized Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) transiting High Risk 
Areas’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-245 (21 January 2013) available at http://www.segumar.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/MMC-245mayo2014.pdf accessed on 16 May 2014. 
367 The Republic of Mauritius response to the IMO FAL Questionnaire on Information on Port and Coastal State 
Requirements Related to Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships, MSC-FAL. 1/Circ.2 
available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Responses-received-on-
Private%20Armed%20Security.aspx accessed on 3 September 2014. 
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clear whether it is also necessary to demonstrate that each security personnel meets the 
requirements of Regulation 62)(7)(f).368 
There is ambiguity in the Regulations to the FCA; alternatively, the authorities are simply not 
applying it correctly.  Thus the researcher recommends that urgent amendments to the FCA are 
required in order to clarify the import permit application requirements, or that consideration is 
given to formulating a list of approved PMSCs following the Panamanian example. 
 
4.2.9 General provisions – Regulation 13  
Regulation 62369 conditions are in addition to those set out in Regulation 13, being the general 
provisions regarding applications required in terms of the FCA.  Regulation 13(1) states that “a 
person applying for, amongst others, a permit for a purpose contemplated in the FCA must apply 
to the Registrar for such permit”.370  There is further ambiguity in the Regulations as the general 
conditions state that applications must be made to the Registrar; however, as noted above, 
Regulation 62(4)(a)/(c) allows for applications to be made directly to the DFO at the port of 
entry.  Regulation 62371 begins with “in addition to the provisions of regulation 13…” It is thus 
left open to interpretation whether the provisions of Regulation 13 override those of Regulation 
62. 
 
4.2.10 Further requirements for persons under Regulation 62(7) 
Regulation 62(7) (h) (iv) states that the holder of a temporary or multiple import permit must 
leave the country with the firearm/s.372  In practice, agents have been nominated in South Africa 
                                                          
368 This would not be the case if Regulation 13(5) of the FCA is strictly applied since a foreign PMSC can then 
never apply for a permit.  Furthermore, if the company is the only applicant, it is difficult to make sense of some of 
the requirements of Regulation 62(7)(f), for example; how does one show that the applicant company is 21 years 
old.  The only alternative is for the application to be made by a South African company, in which case the prior 
approval requirement applicable to non-resident applications for a permit does not apply. 
369 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
370 Ibid Regulation 13(1). 
371 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
372 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Regulation 62(7)(h)(iv): 
…whenever the holder of the temporary import permit leaves the Republic of South Africa the firearm in 
respect of which the permit is issued must accompany the holder of the permit. 
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to make application on behalf of a foreign PMSC and are named as a representative of the PMSC 
and holder of the said permit.373  This practice may contravene the FCA because the South 
African nominee remains in the country whilst the weapons depart on the next vessel, or, 
alternatively, are flown out of the country. 
It is suggested that the most desirable solution is that the permit holder is a local nominee.  
Firstly, this will allow the weapons to be imported and exported on multiple occasions, thereby 
not restricting certain weapons to certain PCASP teams.  Secondly, liability and responsibility 
for the weapons would fall on the local agent as the holder of the permit and this should ease the 
state’s security concerns.  It would be difficult to hold a foreign PMSC responsible for 
contraventions of the FCA if their representatives are not in the country. 
The researcher suggests that this requirement should be clearly codified and an exception made 
for local nominees of PMSCs contracted to provide protection on vessels as defence against acts 
of sea piracy.  Further conditions can be attached to the local agent, including going through the 
normal vetting and security processing and being in possession of certain documentation 
(including a competency certificate).  The local private maritime security industry can be 
regulated and this would prevent persons who are not responsible from holding permits for the 
high powered weapons that arrive on South Africa’s shores. 
 
4.2.11 The 21 day rule 
It was noted above that all applications to the CFR must be submitted 21 days prior to arrival in 
South Africa374 but that this requirement does not apply, in the wording of the regulations, to 
applications made to the DFO on arrival at a South African port. 
                                                          
373 Solace Global Maritime UK Ltd v Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case No. 35/2012 at para. 10 of the Applicant’s Founding Affidavit (David John Peach). 
374 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ - 
SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban Harbour addressed to SAASOA Durban 
Chapter Chairperson, 28 February 2011, (Ref: 3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 3.  Protection 
Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case 




On 16 September 2010, the SAPS National Commander for Durban Harbour communicated with 
local shipping associations and stated, amongst other things, that permit applications for PMSC 
must be submitted to the SAP Commander of the Seaport of Entry and to the CFR 21 days prior 
to the arrival of the vessel. 375 
The SAPS have created further uncertainty by stating that concessions to the 21 day rule will be 
made provided motivation is submitted to the DFO. 376  This leaves shipowners unsure of 
whether applications submitted within the 21 day period will be granted.  No guidance is offered 
on what concessions will be made, and on what grounds they need to be motivated.  For 
example, would a ship owner or PMSC be entitled to a permit if application for same is made 
within 24 hours of a vessel arriving?  Would the fact that urgent repairs are required to the vessel 
or the disembarkation of a sick crew member be sufficient motivation?  It is suggested that the 
SAPS statement is too wide, and clearer guidelines are necessary. 
In terms of the SAPS procedure for permit applications for PMSC, applications are made to the 
local DFO but are in fact sent to the CFR for prior approval.  The researcher is of the view that 
although the SAPS insist on submission of the application for prior approval to the CFR 21 days 
before a vessel’s arrival, this is not practical for the shipping industry.  Secondly, as explained 
above, there is ambiguity in that the regulations set out two ways in which to make an 
application for a permit, each with different conditions.  
These anomalies can be remedied by expressly including the category of PCASP in Regulation 
62(7) (together with hunters and sports shooters) and by setting specific requirements or 
conditions for temporary and multiple import permits.  This will make it clear that they are not 
subject to the prior approval and 21 day rule requirement.  The SAPS state that a reason for the 
                                                          
375 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ – 
SAPS Communiqué from the Officer of the National Commander: Durban Harbour addressed to SAASOA Durban 
Chapter Chairperson, 16 September 2010 (Ref: 3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 1.  Solace 
Global Maritime UK Ltd v Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case No. 
35/2012 annexed to the applicants founding affidavit marked “DJP1” at pg 24 of the indexed bundle of pleadings. 
376 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ – 
SAPS Communiqué from the Officer of the National Commander: Durban Harbour addressed to SAASOA Durban 
Chapter Chairperson, 28 February 2011 (Ref: 3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 3.  Protection 
Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case 




“21 day rule” is completion of the verification process and that the original permit will to be 
mailed to the applicant overseas.377  If one takes into consideration the time it will take for the 
permit to be posted overseas, there is little time to process the permit.  If the permit is to be 
collected from the local DFO, there is a possibility that the process can be expedited and 
finalised well within 21 days of the date of application.  In fact, permits have been issued well 
within the 21 day rule on previous occasions for PCASP teams arriving in the port of Durban.378 
 
4.2.12 Period of validity  
The period of validity for temporary or multiple import permits is six (6) months.379  Should an 
error occur and the PMSC (or its local agent) fails to realise the permit is about to expire, this 
could create delays in a vessel berthing and/or subject persons to arrest and prosecution if the 
permit has or is about to expire and the weapons are on board a vessel sailing towards South 
African territorial waters.380  The researcher recommends that the period of validity be extended 
to 12 months.  This will also lessen the burden on the DFO and CFR by reducing the number of 
applications from PMSC that need to be processed should South Africa be the next hub for 
PCASP teams.  The researcher is of the view that PMSC will not need to use floating armouries 
around the African coastline if the permit process is effective and consistent in allowing for free 
movement of PCASP and weapons on board vessels sailing the East and West Coasts of Africa. 
 
                                                          
377 Information on the Importation of Firearms – South African Police Service website available at 
http://www.saps.gov.za/crime_prevention/firearms/import_info.htm - accessed on 12 November 2013: 
 Issuing of a permit: 
An application submitted directly to the Central Firearms Control Register must be lodged at least 21 days 
in advance to enable the South African Police Service sufficient time to process the application and to 
submit the permit to the applicant to an address outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa or the 
nominated person.  
378 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011 at para. 9 of Derrick Coetzee’s confirmatory affidavit to the applicant’s founding 
affidavit. 
379 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, Regulation 62(7) (i). 
380 This happened in the Solace Global Security v Min. of Safety and Security and others (unreported) KwaZulu-
Natal High Court, Durban Case number 35/2012 case.  Whilst the application for the return of the weapons was in 
the court process, the permit for the seized weapons had expired and an amended order was sought requesting the 
SAPS to renew the said permit in order to lawfully take possession of same if the main prayer of declaring the 
detention and seizure unlawful was upheld. 
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4.2.13 Procedure for weapons remaining on board vessels whilst in port 
During the critical period up to February 2011, vessel agents informed owners and Masters that 
should weapons remain on board, one simply had to make the necessary declaration to the 
authorities in terms of the Customs Act.381 
In other words, the bond store declaration was acceptable and there was no need for a permit if 
the weapons were not being discharged off the vessel.  The Master would declare the weapons as 
transhipment/in-bond cargo and in some cases this was accepted by the SAPS and customs 
authorities.382  The SAPS realised that this posed a serious security risk and was possibly in 
contravention of Section 73 of the FCA. 
A letter to the Chairperson of the Maritime Security Advisory Committee in Pretoria from the 
office of the National Commander of Durban Harbour highlighted the uncertainty with regard to 
the surge of PCASP arriving in South African ports.383  Brigadier Gopaul referred to 
contravention of the FCA and asked for an urgent directive to be issued by the office of the 
Maritime Security Advisory Committee.  On 28 February 2011, Brigadier Gopaul issued a 
directive to SAASOA explaining the SAPS policy on permits for weapons intended to fight sea 
piracy.  The directive states that all weapons, even those remaining on board vessels, must have 
                                                          
381 Section 9 and Rule 9.4 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended.  See the statement by Brigadier 
Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the sea ports of 
entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ – SAPS 
Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban harbour addressed to the Chairperson of the 
Maritime Security Advisory Committee, 24 February 2011(Ref: 3/5/1) at para. 2 and 3 annexed to this dissertation 
marked “B” item 2.   Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-
Natal High Court, Durban Case Number 3390/2011 annexed to the replying affidavit of Mark Andrew Wilson (see 
paragraph 4.6) marked “MAW8”. 
382 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011 at para. 18 of the Applicant’s Founding Affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson); see also 
para. 13 and annexures “MAW3” and “MAW6(1)” of the said affidavit to illustrate the Customs declaration by the 
Master of the mv “Jo Kashi”. 
383 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ – 
SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban harbour addressed to the Chairperson of 
the Maritime Security Advisory Committee 24 February 2011(Ref: 3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” 
item 2.  Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High 
Court, Durban Case Number 3390/2011 annexed to the replying affidavit of Mark Andrew Wilson (see paragraph 
4.6) marked “MAW8”. 
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permits in terms of the FCA.  He went on to expressly state that the use of an in-bond cargo 
declaration would no longer be accepted.384 
This illustrates the confusion about what was allowed and which declarations were accepted.  
The fact that a directive was requested from the Maritime Security Advisory Committee shows 
that the local authorities themselves were unsure of which rules and regulations applied to armed 
guards on board vessels entering our ports. 
Petrig notes that,  
...the domestic laws of the flag, coastal or port States or of the State of incorporation of the 
PMSC often do not contain specific rules on the use of PMSCs. General rules, such as trade 
and weapons regulations, do not always provide satisfactory solutions when applied to private 
security companies protecting merchant ship from pirate attacks.385 
The researcher’s view that amendments are required is strengthened by Petrig’s statement that 
“what seems necessary at this juncture is an effort to coordinate the legal frameworks 
governing the use of PMSCs, as regards both the interpretation of existing rules and the 
creation of new rules”.386  The transfer of weapons and guards “could all be addressed 
through further cooperation between PSCs, port states, and the international maritime 
community to establish uniform and clear protocol for PSCs to follow”387 and “the most 
appropriate and effective way to do this is through a collaborative world effort”.388  Scholars 
agree that a coordinated effort between coastal states is required when adopting or amending 
                                                          
384 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ – 
SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban harbour addressed to SAASOA Durban 
Chapter Chairperson, 28 February 2011, (Ref:  3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 3.  Protection 
Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case 
Number 3390/2011 annexed to the replying affidavit of Mark Andrew Wilson (see paragraph 4.6) marked 
“MAW9”. 
385 A Petrig ‘The Use of Force and Firearms by Private Maritime Security Companies Against Suspected Pirates’ – 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (UK) – page 66 - 1 July 2013.  See also Yvonne M. Dutton 
‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law at 
122 and 157.  See further Potgieter, TD ‘Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features’ 
(August, 2012) 236 Institute for Security Studies Paper at 12.  
386 Ibid at 67.  
387 Mineau M ‘Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Security: The rise of Private Navies in response to Modern Piracy’ 
(2010) Vol. 9 (1) Journal of International Business and Law at 71. 
388 Brittany E. Pizor ‘Lending an “Invisible Hand” to the Navy: Armed Guards as a free market assistance to 
defeating piracy’ (2012) Vol. 45 (1) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law at 571. 
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laws on armed guards to ensure consistency for the maritime industry.  Dutton suggests that a 
convention be developed outlining the laws governing the use of armed guards.389  The 
shipping industry is already burdened with numerous conventions and the researcher is of the 
view that such a convention would not be widely accepted especially in light of the different 
laws adopted by coastal states relating to armed guards, as each has its own national security 
concerns.  It is noted that coastal states’ laws were not developed with the phenomenon of 
PCASP in mind; it is for this reason that South Africa’s FCA does not adequately regulate the 
movement/presence of firearms on board vessels intended for defence against piracy. 
A summary of unreported South African case law follows. The effect of SAPS directives and the 
specific dates when same were issued should be taken in consideration.   
 
4.3 Analysis of South African case law 
During the period September 2010 to September 2011, the demand for PCASP surged with the 
increase in the number of successful pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean.  This is referred to by the 
researcher as the “critical period”.  The incidents discussed in this chapter highlight the shortfalls 
in the FCA and Regulations as well as the difficulties the South African authorities faced in 
dealing with the arrival of foreign nationals with weapons on board vessels entering the 
country’s ports. 
A limited number of cases were heard in South Africa during the critical period; these reveal the 
inconsistent application of the FCA and Regulations by the SAPS. 
 
4.3.1 The arrest of OPS Solutions CC employees  
In December 2010, the Organised Crime Unit, Durban (the Hawks) arrested four employees of a 
local maritime security advisory company, OPS Solutions CC, based in Westville, Durban, for 
                                                          
389 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law at 148. 
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the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition.390  The firearms were all permitted in terms 
of the FCA and were to be utilised on vessels sailing the East Coast of Africa.391  In a highly 
publicised arrest, the Hawks alleged that OPS Solutions CC was not in possession of the required 
storage or transit permits for the weaponry.392 
The criminal charges were withdrawn before the accused’s second appearance in court393 but this 
prevented the renewal of permits for the weapons that were confiscated by the Hawks in 
December 2010.394  The SAPS also refused to entertain new permit applications from OPS 
Solutions CC, on behalf of PVI, for weapons on board the mv “Jo Kashi” which was due to call 
at the Durban port in January 2011 on the basis of the pending criminal charge against its 
representatives, which charges were later withdrawn.395  The failure to entertain the permit 
application on the basis of the unlawful seizure of weapons at OPS Solutions CC premises led, in 
the researcher’s view, to the seizure and subsequent opposed application in the PVI case.  
 
4.3.2 Protection Vessels International v The Minister of Safety and Security 
On 26 January 2011 the SAPS boarded the mv “African Lion” berthed alongside the port of 
Richards Bay and seized three semi-automatic rifles and one pistol belonging to Protection 
Vessels International Ltd (PVI).396  Similarly, on 12 February 2011 the SAPS seized four SIG 
semi-automatic rifles located on board the mv “Jo Kashi” which was anchored four kilometres 
off the Durban coastline.397 
                                                          
390 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011 at para. 5 of the affidavit of Derick John Coetzee annexed to the applicant’s 
founding affidavit. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Kamini Padayachee ‘Gun smuggling accused get bail’ (27 December 2010) available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/gun-smuggling-accused-get-bail-
1.1005272?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot accessed on 16 November 2013. 
393 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011 at para. 7 of the affidavit of Derick John Coetzee annexed to the applicant’s 
founding affidavit. 
394 Ibid para. 16. 
395 Ibid para. 9. 
396 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011 at para. 13 of the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
397 Ibid para. 14. 
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PVI brought an urgent application on 12 March 2011 in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban 
seeking an order directing the respondents to issue an import permit for the weapons and for 
same to be returned to the applicant’s local agent, OPS Solutions CC, once such permits were 
issued. 398  The Minister of Safety and Security,399 the Head of the Organised Crime Unit, 
Durban (the Hawks) and the Registrar of Firearms for Durban were all cited as respondents. 
Mv “African Lion” seizure 
The Master of the mv “African Lion” declared that there were weapons on board in terms of 
standard ISPS procedure.400  The firearms declaration was made to the customs and port 
authorities on 26 January 2011 prior to arrival at the port of Richards Bay.401  The Harbour 
Master raised the issue of the Master not being in possession of a temporary import permit for 
the said weapons and contacted the local SAPS who then seized the weapons on the berthing of 
the vessel.402 
PVI’s representative stated that it was his understanding that import permits were not required 
for weapons that were to remain on board the vessel.  After the Durban DFO refused to entertain 
an import permit application from PVI’s agent it was decided to leave the weapons on board and 
make the customs declaration.403  The deponent made reference to another vessel that had 
entered the port of Richards Bay a mere three weeks earlier and submitted the same declaration 
as the Master of the mv “African Lion” without being in possession of the required import permit 
and the weapons were not seized.404  However, the SAPS seized the weapons on board in this 
instance as the Master was not in possession of an import permit as required in terms of Section 
                                                          
398 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011 notice of motion. 
399 The citation of the Minister of Safety and Security is in fact incorrect and the Minister should have been cited as 
the Minister of Police from the point when President Jacob Zuma announced the appointment and renaming of his 
cabinet on 10 May 2009.  See http://www.saps.gov.za/about/history.php accessed on 28 March 2014.  
400 The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code implemented in terms of Chapter XI-2 of The 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974: London: United Nations (SOLAS). 
401 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, annexure “MAW3” to the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
402 Ibid para. 13 of the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
403 Ibid para. 18. 
404 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 18 of the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
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73 of the FCA, alleging violation of the provisions of the FCA and that the firearms formed part 
of a wider illegal “gun running” investigation by the Hawks.405 
 
Mv “Jo Kashi” seizure 
On 12 February 2011 the Master of the mv “Jo Kashi” submitted a declaration to the port and 
custom authorities at Durban that weapons were on board the vessel.406  The vessel was anchored 
off the coast of Durban awaiting confirmation that the import permit for the weapons had been 
issued by the SAPS as PVI intended disembarking the firearms and ammunition for 
redeployment on a subsequent vessel.407  PVI alleged that because of the criminal charges (which 
were withdrawn on 7 February 2011) against a member of OPS Solutions CC, the SAPS refused 
to entertain a permit application for the said weapons on board the vessel.408  As a result, import 
permits were not issued and the Master of the vessel was informed that the weapons could not be 
discharged in Durban.  The SAPS were aware that weapons were on board and proceeded to 
embark and seize the weapons owned by the applicant whilst the vessel was anchored outside the 
port of Durban. 
The DFO for Durban allegedly stated that the application was not submitted 21 days prior to the 
arrival of the vessel and this was another reason why the permit application was refused.409  
Ironically, import permits for the weapons confiscated by the SAPS from OPS Solutions CC in 
December 2010, and owned by PVI, were renewed by Captain Pillay of the Durban Central 
SAPS.410  Mr Coetzee of OPS Solutions CC stated in his affidavit that previous applications were 
made well short of the 21 days’ notice “rule” and were granted by the SAPS; he argued that this 
                                                          
405 Ibid para. 4-6 of the respondent’s replying affidavit (Daniel Caspures Reyneke) 
406 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, annexure “MAW6” to the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
407 Ibid para. 19. 
408 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 9 of the affidavit of  Derrick John Coetzee annexed to the applicant’s 
founding affidavit. 
409 Ibid.  
410 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 




illustrated the inconsistent application of the policy on permitting weapons for security personnel 
on board vessels.411 
 
The SAPS’s answering affidavit 
In the SAPS’ answering affidavit, Warrant Officer (WO) Reynecke of the SAPS Durban 
Organised Crime Unit set out the grounds for the seizure of the weapons, namely, that the SAPS 
were investigating gun-running offences linked to the applicant as well as various violations of 
the FCA.412  WO Reynecke stated that he was investigating the illegal trade of arms and 
ammunition by Mr Derick Coetzee which originated in South Africa and were shipped to 
Kuwait.413  No further details on when or where this alleged arms trafficking took place were 
provided as the investigation was, according to him, at a sensitive stage and he was acting on 
intelligence supplied by a representative of the United Nations (UN).414  WO Reynecke stated 
that the weapons were seized for the purpose of this investigation in terms of Section 22 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.415  A further answering affidavit was filed by WO Reynecke which 
extended the reasons for the seizure of PVI’s weapons on board both vessels.  It was alleged that 
four of the weapons were tested and found to be fully automatic.416  Fully automatic weapons are 
not permitted in terms of the FCA,417 let alone to enter South African territory without the 
correct documentation and without going through the relevant process as governed by the 
NCACA. 
PVI highlighted the fact that the SAPS themselves were not clear on the application of the FCA 
to weapons that are to remain on board vessels and whether or not permits were required.  In this 
regard, the applicant pointed out that its weapons were seized nearly two months prior to a 
                                                          
411 Ibid para. 9.  
412 Ibid para. 2 of the second respondent’s answering affidavit. 
413 Ibid para. 5 – 6. 
414 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 4-5 of the second respondent’s supplementary opposing affidavit (Daniel 
Caspures Reyneke). 
415 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as amended. 
416 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 10-11 of the second respondent’s supplementary opposing affidavit (Daniel 
Caspures Reyneke). 
417 Such weapons are defined as “prohibited firearms” in terms of section 4(1)(a) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 
2000, as amended. 
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directive being issued by the SAPS Durban Harbour Commander to the local maritime industry 
via SAASOA.418  It was this “grey area” that resulted in PVI ordering that the weapons remain 
on board both vessels and not be disembarked because permits were not obtained by the time of 
the vessel’s arrival in South African territory.419 
 
Judgement in the Protection Vessels International v Minister of Police case 
On 22 March 2011, Madam Justice Mbatha handed down judgment after hearing oral argument 
from both parties.  It was common cause that the seizure of the applicant’s weapons was without 
a warrant, and that there were no permits in place for the said weapons at the time of the 
seizure.420 
The Judge referred to Regulation 62 of the FCA421 and stated that prior approval was required for 
permit applications by a non-resident applicant carrying weapons on board merchant vessels 
entering South Africa.   
Justice Mbatha stated that the communiqués from the Durban Harbour Commander of the SAPS 
during February 2011 did not confirm that there was a grey area in the interpretation of the 
FCA.422  She held that the requirements set out in the legislation were clear and needed no 
further interpretation.423  Further she held that the provisions are mandatory and cannot be 
waived at the discretion of the official charged with issuing licenses.  
The Judge held that the court was not empowered to order the respondents to issue or even 
consider permit applications which are not before it.  This would be usurping the powers of the 
administrative arm of government.  The court held that PVI failed to discharge the onus on it to 
                                                          
418 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 4.6 of the applicant’s replying affidavit referring to MAW8 and MAW9. 
419 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 18 of the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
420 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, page 2 of the Judgment. 
421 Regulation 62 to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
422 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, page 8 (line 24) and page 10 (line 24) of the Judgment. 
423 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, page 11 (lines 3-6) of the Judgment. 
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prove on a balance of probabilities that the granting of the order as set out in the notice of motion 
outweighed the interests of the SAPS and the state, especially because four weapons were tested 
and found to be fully automatic according to the second respondent’s version. 
The applicants faced the difficult task of obtaining the order sought in the notice of motion 
because they were not in possession of valid firearms import permits and the application was 
dismissed with costs. 
Comment on the PVI case 
The researcher is of the view that although the order was correct in that that applicant did not 
have valid firearms permits when their weapons entered South African territory, the judgment 
highlights the shortcomings of the FCA and Regulations thereto. 
Firstly, the inconsistent application of the law by the South African police authorities led the 
applicant (or its agent) to believe that by ensuring that the weapons remained on board whilst the 
vessel was in port, there was no need for an import permit and that the regular declarations to the 
South African Customs and the Harbour Master were sufficient.  This was confirmed by the 
applicant’s representative who stated that numerous vessels had called at port in similar 
situations and no action had been taken against the Master or security personnel.424 
Secondly, it appears that the permits would have been issued but for the applicant’s local agent, 
OPS Solutions CC member’s pending criminal charge (which was withdrawn a month 
subsequent to the seizures).425  Had this occurred it would have been an entirely different case 
altogether as permits would most probably have been issued prior to the weapons entering South 
African territory.  The fact that permits were renewed for other weapons in OPS Solutions CC’s 
possession illustrates the completely ad hoc and inconsistent review of permit applications by the 
SAPS during the critical period.426 
                                                          
424 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 18 of the applicant’s founding affidavit (Mark Andrew Wilson). 
425 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case Number 3390/2011, para. 7 of the affidavit of Derrick Coetzee’s annexed to the applicant’s founding 
affidavit. 
426 Protection Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 




Thirdly, and most importantly, the Judge’s interpretation of the Regulations to the FCA, in 
particular the 21 day rule is of concern.  In the researcher’s view, the Judge erred in not taking 
into account the second part of Regulation 62(4)(a), particularly 62(4)(c), where provision is 
made for permit applications to be submitted directly to delegated DFOs and where the 
Regulations contain no express 21 day rule requirement. 
The Judge’s use of the words “prior approval” was, in the researcher’s view, not correctly put in 
context in terms of the FCA Regulations.  Prior approval from the registrar is only required for 
non-resident applicants who do not fall into the categories set out in Regulation 62(7) (a) – (e).  
The researcher has discussed at length that an application for “prior approval” does not always 
need to be submitted 21 days before arrival – this is only required for permit applications 
submitted directly to the Registrar at the Central Firearms Registry. 
One cannot disregard the inconsistent application of the FCA by the SAPS.  When a number of 
vessels are allowed to berth in Durban Harbour with weapons and the police do not seize the 
equipment or arrest the Master for failing to have a permit, precedent is set for the industry and 
ships agents who are tasked with ensuring that their principals/clients comply with local laws and 
procedures.  With respect, the Judge failed to address the provision that allows direct application 
to be made to the DFO and did not consider Regulation 62(4)(7)(h) with regard to circumstances 
where prior approval is required.  The dictum in this judgment remains open to challenge based 
on the wording of the Regulations. 
This judgment affirms the researcher’s view that the Regulations to the FCA require 
amendments in order for the maritime security industry to gain clarity on the correct procedure 
and requirements.  The SAPS are not interpreting the current legislation correctly when dealing 
with privately armed security personnel arriving on vessels in South African ports because the 
legislation does not cater for this category of foreign persons seeking firearms import permits. 
The question also arises as to whether a coastal state can prevent a foreign flagged vessel 
exercising its right of innocent passage in its territorial waters.  Petrig argues that: 
Article 27 UNCLOS limits the coastal State′s competence to enforce violations of its domestic 
criminal law. While it has criminal jurisdiction against ships bound for, or leaving, its internal 
waters, Article 27 provides that it should not be exercised over foreign flagged vessels 
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(including persons on board) merely passing through territorial waters.  This provision is, 
however, subject to a number of exceptions, including, ′if the consequences of the crime 
extend to the coastal State′ and ′if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or 
the good order of the territorial sea′. Even if the possession of arms or the presence of armed 
guards on board a merchant ship were a criminal offence under the coastal State′s criminal 
law, the consequences of this do not seem to extend to the coastal State if the ship were simply 
passing through the territorial sea without making a port call.427 
It is thus debatable whether or not the SAPS had the right to seize the weapons on board the mv 
“Jo Kashi” whilst she was anchored off the coast of Durban and if the South African government 
violated the vessel’s right of innocent passage in terms of Article 19 of UNCLOS.  Noting 
Petrig’s views, it is sufficient to say that because the mv “Jo Kashi” was intending to enter South 
African inland waters (i.e., the Durban port), the SAPS did in fact have a right of search and 
seizure even though the vessel was anchored off Durban’s coast and the owners or flag state may 
find it difficult to argue that South Africa breached the vessel’s right of innocent passage. 
 
4.3.3 The Owner of the mv “Roelof” v The Minister of Police 
On 21 September 2011 the owner of the mv “Roelof”, Mr Ralph van Urk (a Dutch national) 
brought an urgent application in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban citing the Minister of 
Police and Brigadier Anthony Gopaul (SAPS Commander of the Durban Harbour).428 
The applicant sought an interdict directing (i) that the SAPS issue a temporary import permit for 
two weapons held on board the mv “Roelof”; or alternatively, (ii) that the SAPS take custody of 
the weapons once the vessel berthed in the port of Durban and return same prior to sailing; (iii) 
that the SAPS be interdicted from arresting or detaining any person on board the vessel in respect 
                                                          
427 A Petrig ‘The Use of Force and Firearms by Private Maritime Security Companies Against Suspected Pirates’ – 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (UK) 1 July 2013 chapter VI(A) para. 1. 
428 Ralph van Urk – The owner of the mv “Roelof” v The Minister of Police and Another (unreported) KwaZulu-
Natal High Court, Durban Case No. 10610/2011. 
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of any charge relating to the possession of unlicensed firearms and (iv) that the respondents bear 
the legal costs if the application was opposed.429 
The application was brought on an urgent basis because the vessel was due to arrive in the port 
of Durban a couple of hours later on the same day the matter was to be heard.430  Mr Van Urk 
sought assistance from the court after the SAPS refused to issue a temporary import permit.  On 
15 September 2011 an application for a temporary import permit had been made by his erstwhile 
attorneys, Shepstone & Wylie, seven days prior to the vessel’s arrival in Durban.431 
Mr van Urk had fixed a time charter whilst in the port of Mombasa and was ordered to sail to 
Durban to load project cargo; this instruction was received on 14 September 2011.432  The agents 
in Durban had immediately made enquiries with the local SAPS in order to obtain the necessary 
permit for the weapons to enter South African territory. 
Acting on instructions received from the National Head of Security for Transnet National Ports 
Authority,433 the applicant’s attorneys had applied for an “in-transit” permit as the weapons were 
to remain on board whilst in port.  The researcher has illustrated above that, where weapons are 
to remain on board a vessel, the correct permit would be an “import/export” permit and not an 
“in-transit” permit.  The deponent to the applicant’s founding affidavit confirmed under oath that 
the local DFO and SAPS representative advised him that a temporary import permit application 
must be submitted and not an in-transit permit.434  There were thus contradictory instructions 
from the port authority and the SAPS. 
The applicant’s attorneys alleged that the same SAPS representative stated that because the 
applicant for the permit was a natural person, he was precluded from making such application 
unless the “firearms were to be utilised for a sporting event, hunting or trade fair”.435  Direct 
                                                          
429 Ibid applicant’s notice of motion. 
430 Ibid para. 8 of the applicant’s founding affidavit. 
431 Ibid para. 9. 
432 Ibid para. 12. 
433 Ralph van Urk – The owner of the mv “Roelof” v The Minister of Police and Another (unreported) KwaZulu-
Natal High Court, Durban Case No. 10610/2011, para.20 of the applicant’s founding affidavit.  Reference is made to 
the email from Jabulani Moleya to Peter Balfour dated 14 April 2011.  A copy of this correspondence is annexed to 
this dissertation marked “B” item 4. Ralph van Urk – The owner f the mv “Roelof” v Minister of Police and Another 
(unreported), KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case number 10610/2011 annexure “WMW 3” to the applicant’s 
founding affidavit. 
434 Ibid para. 23 of the applicant’s founding affidavit. 
435 Ibid para. 23 of the applicant’s founding affidavit. 
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reference must therefore be made to Regulation 62 (7) (a) – (c)436 as the alleged authority for this 
statement from the SAPS.  An applicant is defined in Section 1 of the FCA as “a natural person 
or juristic person acting through its responsible person”.437  The SAPS interpretation of the FCA 
was questioned and again highlights the issue of the prevailing legislation dealing with firearms 
in respect of armed guards. 
The applicant argued that the FCA did not distinguish between a natural and juristic person in 
terms of the requirements for in-transit or import permit applications.438  The applicant referred 
to a verbal statement from the SAPS that any permit application from the owner of the mv 
“Roelof”, whether in-transit or import and export, would be refused on the basis that it must be 
submitted 21 days prior to the vessel’s arrival.439 
The applicant contended that there was no other available remedy than to come to court on an 
urgent basis.  The option of throwing the weapons overboard was canvassed; however, the 
applicant would be personally liable for prosecution in The Netherlands and possibly be denied a 
firearms licence in the future. 440  Mr Van Urk considered a ship-to-ship transfer of the weapons 
outside the territorial waters of South Africa (to escape the application of South African laws) 
but bad weather conditions prevented this option.441   
Justice Mnguni granted an order on 21 September 2011 in respect of prays (ii) and (iii) directing 
the SAPS to take custody of the weapons and return same prior to the vessel’s departure from the 
port of Durban and interdicting the respondents’ from arresting or detaining any person on board 




                                                          
436 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
437 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
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Comment on the mv “Roelof” case 
The case was heard during the critical period when the SAPS were unsure of how to handle 
permit applications for weapons on board merchant vessels used in the fight against acts of sea 
piracy.  Every effort was made by the applicant’s attorneys to comply with the SAPS 
requirements in order to obtain the necessary firearms permit. 
The fact that the owner was only aware of its scheduled call to Durban seven days prior to arrival 
highlights the need for greater efficiency and consistency in respect of the permit application 
process and regulations.  The SAPS relied on the “infamous” 21 day rule as one of the reasons 
for refusing to issue the firearms permit but this was unreasonable as the applicant had supplied 
all the documentation required in terms of the FCA and Regulations thereto and there have been 
circumstances, as illustrated in the PVI case, where the 21 day rule has not been strictly applied.  
The researcher has argued at length regarding the unreasonableness of the 21 day rule and is of 
the view that this case should be used as a basis for clarity and/or amendments to the Regulations 
to provide for the specialised needs of the shipping industry. 
The statement by the SAPS representative that persons who apply in their personal capacity can 
only be issued with a permit if they are a sports shooter, hunter or attending a trade/collectors’ 
fair is not in accordance with the Regulations to the FCA.  The SAPS omitted to take cognisance 
of Regulation 62(7) (f),442 namely the catch-all category for applicants who do not fall under the 
remainder of the categories.  The fact that the order was granted by the KwaZulu-Natal High 
Court speaks volumes and the applicant was able to show on a balance of probabilities that the 
prejudice to the Master outweighed the SAPS’ concern about not complying with the 21 day 
rule.  Full disclosure was made to the court, including the weapons permit and flag state 
authorisation.  The researcher is of the view that the remedy of approaching the courts can be 
avoided by means of clear, codified policies and firm intention on the part of South African 
government to facilitate PCASP arriving in South African ports with weapons and ammunition. 
 
 
                                                          
442 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended. 
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4.3.4 Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v The Minister of Police 
On 9 January 2012 (almost a year after the seizure of the PVI weapons), an urgent application 
was brought in the Durban High Court by a UK registered Company, Solace Global Maritime 
Ltd, against the Minister of Police and three others (the Solace Case).443  It is noteworthy that 
two colonels’ in the Hawks were cited in their personal capacities, namely a Col. Dafel and Col. 
Reyneke (who was also the investigating officer in the PVI case). 
The applicant sought an order directing the respondents to return three Izhmash firearms 
belonging to the company which had been seized by the Hawks on board the mv “Elinakous” on 
18 March 2011 in the port of Durban.444  A criminal case of unlawful possession of firearms was 
opened at the Maydon Wharf police station under CAS: 90/03/2011445; however, no person was 
arrested or charged for the alleged contravention of the FCA.  The holder and person named on 
the temporary import firearms permit, Mr Robert Davies, was asked to submit to a warning 
statement but he refused to do so.446 
The applicant’s South African nominee/agent, Maritime Operations duly represented by Jane and 
Robert Davies presented a valid SAPS import permit number TI4211212 for the seized weapons 
with an expiry date of 30 September 2011.447  This permit was signed and issued by Captain 
Vishnu Pillay of the Durban Central Police Station on 4 March 2011.448  The permit was issued 
in the name of Robert Davies c/o Maritime Operations with an address on the Bluff, Durban.  It 
was submitted by the applicant that, on the face of it, valid permits were in place for the weapons 
and same were entitled to enter South African territory. 
A subsequent permit was issued for the seized weapons but in the name of Jane Davies c/o 
Maritime Operations.  The reason for the subsequent permit was because the initial permit 
(TI4211212) expired. 
                                                          
443 Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case number 35/2012. 
444 Ibid para. 16 of the applicant’s founding affidavit (David John Peach). 
445 Ibid para. 18. 
446 Ibid para. 23.4 of the respondent’s answering affidavit. 




Despite numerous letters, requests for meetings and representations to the SAPS, the Hawks 
refused to return the firearms to the applicant’s agent and the holder of the said import permit.  
The Hawks alleged that the permit was granted unlawfully and that the person in whose name the 
permit was granted, namely Mr Robert Davies, was not in actual possession of the firearms as 
same were on board a vessel anchored outside the port of Durban.449  Captain Vishnu Pillay 
confirmed under oath that the renewal permit was granted to Jane Davies for the seized weapons 
but at the time “she did not disclose to me that the firearms were not in her possession”.450  The 
weapons were ironically in the care and custody of the SAPS at the time the renewal of the 
import permit was issued after the court application was launched. 
The SAPS also alleged that the responsible person named on the permit/s was not in possession 
of a competency certificate.451  The SAPS contended that the applicants were in contravention of 
the FCA and liable for prosecution.  However, on 16 November 2011, the National Prosecuting 
Authority declined to prosecute any persons after representations were made as to why there was 
no contravention of the FCA.452 
The issues in this case were as follows: 
1. Whether anyone was in contravention of the FCA for failing to have a valid permit for 
weapons on board the vessel in South African territory. 
2. Whether the two permits issued for Solace’s weapons in the name of Robert and Jane 
Davies were/are valid. 
3. If not, whether the permits were duly cancelled in terms of Section 81 of the FCA. 
A valid import and export permit453 was issued by the SAPS for the weapons which were seized 
on board the mv “Elinakous”.  As was the procedure in Durban, a local agent duly appointed by 
a foreign PMSC made the application for the permit in their name.  This is confirmed by the fact 
that numerous permits had been issued in Mr Robert Davies’ name as a representative of Solace 
Global Maritime Ltd.   
                                                          
449 Ibid para. 18.9 of the respondent’s answering affidavit. 
450 Ibid para. 9 page 148 of the indexed bundle -Vishnu Pillay’s confirmatory affidavit. 
451 Ibid para. 13.2 of the respondent’s answering affidavit. 
452 Ibid para. 36 of the applicant’s founding affidavit. 
453 Ibid para. 13 with reference to annexure “DJP2”. 
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Section 77(1) of the FCA454 prescribes that a temporary or multiple import and export permit 
constitutes a licence to possess such firearms in South Africa.  The averment that the holder of 
the permit in this case was not in actual possession at the time of making the application 
demonstrates the shortfalls in the FCA in relation to maritime security operations.  If this 
requirement was to be strictly applied, each and every vessel entering South African territory 
with arms on board would be subject to search and seizure as the local agent would only present 
the permit on the berthing of the vessel and therefore be in “actual” possession of the firearms 
once on board or when the weapons disembarked.    
Taking into consideration the previous conduct of the SAPS in allowing local agents to hold a 
permit for weapons arriving in South Africa, the seizure of the applicant’s weapons suggests that 
the Hawks were possibly acting on a frolic of their own by seizing the weapons which were duly 
permitted to enter South African territory.  The pleadings show that numerous teams with 
weapons had entered and departed the port of Durban without any problems.  It was argued that a 
number of import firearms permits were issued to Solace’s agent previously by the same DFO, 
Captain Pillay, and there does not seem to be a reasonable explanation for the seizure by the 
Hawks in this case. 
In fact, the import permit was issued two weeks prior to the seizure and arrival of the mv 
“Elinakous” in Durban.455  Counsel for the applicant correctly argued that the permit was valid 
and was not cancelled in terms of the FCA and therefore the seizure of the weapons was 
unlawful. 
 
Validity of the Permits 
There was no notification from the SAPS that the permits were cancelled at the time of the 
seizure as required in terms of Section 81(2) of the FCA.456  The weapons were permitted in 
                                                          
454 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended: 
Section 77(1) - A permit for the import of a firearm or ammunition also constitutes a licence to possess 
such firearms or ammunition for such person or period as the Registrar may specify on the permit. 
455 Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban Case number 35/2012, para. 41 of the applicant’s founding affidavit. 
456 Section 81(2) states: 
 The Registrar may, by written notice, cancel an import, export or in-transit permit if the permit holder- 
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terms of Section 73 of the FCA and this constituted a licence to possess same in South African 
territory.  The SAPS were aware, as had been the practice in Durban, that vessels would arrive in 
port and the local agent would present the firearms permit on the quayside.  Any time prior to the 
berthing of the vessel would technically denote that the weapons were not permitted as the 
holder would be on the quayside and not on board the vessel with the PCASP team and weapons. 
 
Notice of Cancellation 
The SAPS issued a Section 81 notice of cancellation of the import permit to Mr and Mrs Davies 
c/o Maritime Operations on 2 February 2012.457  This confirms that the permits were in fact valid 
when the weapons were seized on 18 March 2011; otherwise the cancellation notice would not 
have been issued subsequent to the institution of legal proceedings. 
The applicants initially sought a costs order against the two Colonels in the Hawks as they had 
clearly acted outside the ambit of the FCA.  The matter was also referred to the Independent 
Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) for investigation into the conduct of the two police 
officers.  On 18 June 2012 Justice Gorvin granted an order to the effect that (1) the seizure and 
detention of the three weapons by the Respondents was and continued to be unlawful; (2) that the 
firearms would remain in the custody of the Respondents pending the outcome of an application 
for a permit for the weapons, (3) if a permit was granted, then the firearms were to be returned to 
the applicant or it’s nominee, and (4) costs to be paid by the First Respondent. 
The reason for the order in the second paragraph was because by the time the judgment was 
handed down, the renewed permit in the name of Mrs Jane Davies had expired and the court 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(a) no longer qualifies to hold the permit; or 
(b) has contravened or failed to comply with any provision of this Act or any condition specified in 
the permit. 
(3) A notice contemplated in subsection (2) may only be issued if the Registrar has- 
(a) given the holder 30 days' notice in writing to submit written representations as to why the permit 
should not be cancelled; and 
(b) duly considered any representations received and all the facts pertaining to the matter. 
457 Solace Global Maritime Ltd UK v Minister of Police and others (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 




could not condone a contravention of the FCA458 by allowing the weapons to be delivered to the 
applicant without a valid permit. 
 
Comment on the Solace Global Case 
The SAPS strictly interpreted certain sections of the FCA in alleging that the permit was issued 
based on incorrect information supplied by Solace’s local agent.  The SAPS themselves did not 
apply the provisions of the FCA by issuing the necessary cancellation notice and acted outside 
the ambit of the legislation by seizing weapons which were permitted to enter South African 
territory. 
The fact that the SAPS seized the weapons on the basis that the holder was “not in possession of 
same at the time of making application” is untenable as the necessary declaration was made by 
the applicant that the weapons were arriving on a vessel in Durban on or about a certain date.  
The DFO for Durban had issued countless permits during the “critical period” and for the SAPS 
to utilise one requirement as the basis for the seizure, is in the researcher’s view, unreasonable 
and unjustifiable in the circumstances of the arrival of PCASP in South African ports. 
The conduct of the police officials is questionable in that only three of the nine weapons on 
board the mv “Elinakous” were seized. One has to question why, based on the SAPS’ version of 
events that the permits were invalid, only these weapons were seized and not the entire arsenal.  
No explanation was provided in the papers presented before the court. 
This case caused embarrassment for the SAPS and South Africa, notwithstanding a hefty costs 
order as a result of the unlawful seizure of the weapons by the Hawks.459 
Mineau comments that: 
                                                          
458 Namely Section 73 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, as amended, that an import permit is required. 
459 Tania Broughton ‘Security firm wants seized guns back’ (9 February 2012) The Mercury available at: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/security-firm-wants-seized-guns-back-1.1230348 accessed on 24 March 
2014.  See also ‘Security Firm wants return of seized guns it bought in Malta’ (12 February 2012) The Malta 
Independent available at http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2012-02-12/news/security-firm-wants-return-of-
seized-guns-it-bought-in-malta-305701/ accessed on 24 March 2014. 
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While legitimate concerns over territorial sovereignty make the use of PSCs problematic, the 
navies of the world have been ineffective at preventing and combating piracy.  Therefore the 
use of private security at sea is not only a viable option, but a necessity for many shipping 
companies routinely facing this threat.  Private navies are on the rise, and the international 
community should respond to this trend by uniting in a cooperative effort to reach some type 
of acceptable compromise on how PSCs should be regulated.460 
Petrig states that 
...depending on the locus of the ship, different sets of rules apply to the question of whether, 
and under which circumstances, arms and/or armed guards are allowed on board merchant 
ships. These rules may not only differ and/or contradict each other, but their interpretation by 
domestic authorities often cannot be anticipated with a sufficient degree of certainty.461 
This certainly holds true for the SAPS in dealing with the presence of PCASP in the Republic of 
South Africa in the past three years.  The interpretation of the FCA by the SAPS in applying the 
circumstances of PCASP has led to court action following weapon seizures where valid permits 
were in fact issued.  Ambiguity arises in applying the Regulations to the FCA to PCASP; for 
example, where the holder of the import permit must be in possession of the weapons, but this 
can only occur once the vessel is alongside and weapons are disembarked. 
Mokoena reports that, at a recent workshop on maritime policing,  stakeholders in Southern 
Africa recognised that there needs to “be more coordination and cooperation between state 
departments, individual countries, and inter-governmental organizations” with regard to policing 
maritime crime, most notably piracy.462  The workshop concluded that “policing alone, or even 
the navy alone, is not enough” to prevent/reduce maritime crime.463 
The researcher reiterates the view that there is an urgent need to amend the Regulations to the 
FCA in order to prevent uncertainty and indifferent application by the SAPS.  The legislature 
                                                          
460 Mineau M ‘Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Security:  The rise of Private Navies in response to Modern Piracy’ 
(2010) Vol. 9 (1) Journal of International Business and Law at 68.  
461 A Petrig ‘The Use of Force and Firearms by Private Maritime Security Companies Against Suspected Pirates’  
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (UK) 1 July 2013.  See also Potgieter, TD ‘Maritime Security in the 
Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features’ (August, 2012) 236 Institute for Security Studies Paper at 12. 
462 B.P.O. Mokoena ‘Report from the Workshop on Maritime Policing to Combat Maritime Crime’ (2013) 2(3&4) 




should be made aware of this case and the shortcomings, in the researcher’s view, in the FCA 






This study examined the international maritime industry’s response to armed guards as a means 
of self-defence against acts of sea piracy.  The IMO guidelines or recommendations to flag states 
and vessel owners were formulated to address the demand for PCASP by ship operators with the 
“blessing” of the United Nations Security Council.  The impact of these personnel on a coastal 
state’s sovereignty was not overlooked and the IMO offered recommendations that member 
coastal and port states should consider when making a decision to allow armed guards to 
disembark or embark in their ports. 
A number of flag states have amended their legislation or published guidelines for vessel owners 
in an attempt to regulate the presence of armed personnel on board vessels registered in their 
respective countries.  This study comparatively analysed the provisions of the policies adopted 
by Panama, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom.  It was noted that there are some common 
provisions.  Issues such as risk assessment, rules on the use of force, formal agreement between 
the PMSC and vessel owners as well as a due diligence of the PMSC were addressed.  The 
Egyptian government’s position on the presence of armed guards in Port Said and the Suez Canal 
and the amended position after only six months were also discussed.  The policies of coastal 
states around the Gulf of Aden identified as “hub points” for PMSC equipment and personnel 
transfer operations were discussed and specific procedures were identified that could be a model 
for South Africa in developing an amended policy on PCASP. 
It was noted that both flag states and coastal and port states should have a clear and concise 
codified policy on armed guards and that a number of states have published such policies and 
responded to the IMO questionnaire so that their responses are now available on the IMO 
website, with the exception of South Africa. 
The South African Firearms Control Act No. 60 of 2000 (FCA) and Regulations thereto were 
analysed in order to determine whether they adequately provide for the movement of weapons by 
PCASP within the Republic of South Africa and whether the police authorities have been 
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applying the law correctly.  With reference to the South African unreported case law discussed in 
Chapter Four, the researcher is of the view that the Regulations to the FCA require amendment 
in order to specifically cater for PCASP arriving in South African ports.  The current legislation 
was not developed with the unique demand for armed personnel on board merchant vessels in 
South African territory in mind and the specialised operations of the maritime industry need to 
be considered in developing policies and laws on the issue of armed guards. 
The researcher is further of the view that as a member state of the IMO, South Africa has an 
obligation to develop policies on armed guards which “do not hinder the continuation of 
maritime trade or interfere with the navigation of ships and should ensure that all are consistent 
with international law”.464  The three cases heard in the Durban High Court are an indication that 
the actions of the South African Police Service (SAPS) could well have hindered maritime trade 
and interfered with the navigation of the ships in question.  The mv “Roelof”, for example, 
would have been forced either to sail outside South African territory for a further 17 days whilst 
the permit application was being processed or to call at another port, an action which may have 
had serious consequences, including a breach of its charter party agreement.  The SAPS’ refusal 
to issue an import permit could have fallen within the ambit of “hindering maritime trade or 
interfering with the navigation of ships” but for the court order obtained by the owner’s erstwhile 
attorneys. 
The researcher is of the view that the period of validity of the import permits should be extended. 
Djibouti grants annual permits to PMSC to conduct operations in its ports. The reason for this 
was highlighted in Chapter Four with reference to the PVI v Minister of Safety and Security and 
Solace Global Ltd cases.  The seizure of weapons can significantly affect the operations of a 
PMSC and this should be avoided. 
The key research questions posed in the introduction to this dissertation are addressed below: 
 
 
                                                          
464 IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Armed 
Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1408/Rev.1, Annex para. 6. 
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5.1.1 What international legal instruments regulate the use of PCASP on board merchant 
vessels? 
There are no specific international conventions that deal with or regulate the use of PCASP on 
board merchant ships.  The IMO guidelines, recommendations, best management practises and 
published reports, although non-mandatory, are legal frameworks that member states are urged to 
utilise when implementing national policy or legislation on the use of PCASP, whether as a flag 
state, shipowner, port state or private maritime security company.  These include the IMO 
Recommendations to Flag States,465 IMO Guidance to Shipowners,466 IMO Recommendations to 
Port States,467 PMSC Guidelines468 and BMP4.469 
 
5.1.2 What policies have been adopted by traditional maritime nations as well as coastal 
states with jurisdiction near the Gulf of Aden relating to armed guards on merchant 
vessels? 
The United Kingdom and Norway amended their existing legislation in order to regulate and 
hence permit the use of PCASP on board vessels flying their flag.  These amendments took the 
form of new regulations specifically governing PCASP, in the case of Norway, or interim 
recommendations to the shipping industry, in the case of the UK Guidance document.  The 
Panamanian Maritime Authority issued express authorisation for the use of armed guards on 
board vessels flying its flag and went further to list approved PMSCs, allowing shipowners to 
engage these firms without further approval.  However, Italy remains determined to supply 
VPDs and the use of PCASP on board Italian flagged vessels is permitted only if VPDs are 
unavailable.  The researcher is of the view that there is strong support for the use of PCASP as 
                                                          
465 IMO Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on board ships in the high risk area.  MSC.1/Circ. 1406. Rev.1. 
466 IMO Interim Guidance to shipowners, ship operators, and shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed 
security personnel on board ships in the high risk area.  MSC.1/Circ. 1405. Rev.2. 
467 IMO Revised Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area.  MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1. 
468 IMO Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1443. 
469 Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, Version 4 – August 2011 -  IMO 
Resolution MSC.324(89) on ‘Implementation of Best Management Practice Guidance by the publication:  IMO 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia’ – MSC.1/Circ. 1339. 
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defence against acts of sea piracy from major maritime nations and hence South Africa should 
review its legislation and policies in order to keep up with global standards.  The researcher is of 
the view that developing a system of “blanket approval” modelled on the Mauritian policy for 
certain PMSCs and publishing a list of approved firms, like the Panamanian Maritime Authority 
has done, will reduce the onerous processing of permit applications.  The process would be 
streamlined if a firm is already on the list and thereafter limited documentation, specifically 
relating to the weapons and details of the security personnel will be required. 
The Egyptian policy on armed guards changed within a period of six months and the current 
requirements are that vessels intending to transit the Suez Canal with weapons must disembark 
the weapons at the entry point and the Egyptian police will transport same to the exit point for 
embarkation back onto the vessel.  Where vessels are calling at an Egyptian port, the weapons 
are to be delivered to the Egyptian police to be returned shortly prior to departure.  Documents 
must be submitted by vessel owners should a call at an Egyptian port be intended.  South Africa 
can learn from the Egyptian experience and should avoid adopting a policy on PCASP that has 
not been discussed with stakeholders, with a view to developing coherent policy and procedure 
on the permitting, storage, transiting and possession of firearms belonging to PMSC in South 
African ports.  The Mauritian authorities have developed a “prior authorization” procedure for 
PMSCs who intend operating in Mauritian territory and those with such authorisation must 
merely provide 48 hours’ notice of arrival of a vessel with a PCASP team on board in order to 
disembark equipment and personnel for transit or storage in the custody of the Mauritian police. 
Unlike the Egyptian approach, the researcher recommends that the SAPS do not take weapons 
into their possession and transit same between the vessel and storage facilities.  This will 
unnecessarily burden the SAPS and can be effectively controlled by publishing clear and strict 







5.1.3 Does South Africa allow firearms to be brought into its territory on board merchant  
vessels? 
South Africa does allow firearms and PCASP to be embarked or disembarked in South African 
ports.  Section 73 of the FCA read with Regulation 62 provides for a non-resident to make 
application for a compulsory firearms permit to be obtained prior to arrival.  The process and 
conditions attached to the permit are where South African law falls short of the international 
guidelines set by the IMO.  The South African police authorities have a difficult task in applying 
legislation that does not specifically cater for the category of persons assigned to vessel 
protection.  While it is desirable that they continue to facilitate weapons permit applications to 
the best of their ability, it is recommended that the FCA and Regulations be amended to make 
the process clear and capable of consistent application. 
Petrig states that PMSCs “should leap the administrative hurdle and acquire the necessary coastal 
or port State authorizations and/or licenses necessary for their arms and armed guards”.470  This 
has occurred in South Africa.  What is required is a more efficient and coherent system for the 
permitting of weapons and disembarking of PCASP. 
 
5.1.4 What is the process involved in obtaining the necessary permission/documentation? 
As noted in Chapter Four, a PCASP requires an import permit for weapons that will enter South 
African territory.   
An application with supporting documentation including the firearm licence, proof of authority 
to export from country of origin, details of the PCASP and the serial numbers of the weapons 
must be submitted to the Registrar at the Central Firearms Registry at least 21 days prior to the 
arrival of the vessel.  Although this is the correct procedure to obtain an import permit, the SAPS 
have allowed for concessions to the 21 day rule. 
 
                                                          
470 A Petrig ‘The Use of Force and Firearms by Private Maritime Security Companies Against Suspected Pirates’  
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (UK) – page 39 (1 July 2013).  
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5.1.5 What conditions are attached to such permission? 
The firearms permitted to enter South Africa are set out in the SAPS temporary or multiple 
import and export permit with the make and serial numbers.  The permit is valid for six months 
and the holder of the permit must present it once the weapons arrive in South African territory.  
As noted in the SAPS communiqué, only licensed transporters and storage facilities may handle 
or store the weapons if they are disembarked in the Republic.471  In the PVI v Minister of Safety 
and Security case, the SAPS insisted that the applicant must be in possession of the weapons at 
the time of applying for the permit.  This is untenable for PMSC, who nominate local agents as 
holders of import weapons permits.  The holders of the permits are only in “possession” of the 
weapons once the vessel is alongside and the weapons are disembarked or the agent goes on 
board. 
 
5.1.6 Does the current South African legislation specifically cater for armed guards on 
board merchant vessels entering its ports? 
Despite the FCA being applicable to PCASP and permitting weapons, the specific operational 
requirements of PMSC and vessel owners need to be catered for and amendments to the 
Regulations are, in the researcher’s view, the best way to bridge this gap in the law. 
The study’s key findings with regard to shortcomings in the existing legislation were: 
1. Presently, PCASP do not fall within the category of foreign persons who are entitled to 
apply for an import permit without prior approval from the Registrar in Pretoria.  PCASP 
are thus required to obtain prior approval from the Registrar before making an application 
for a firearms permit.  This is not required if one is a hunter, sports shooter, or foreign 
law enforcement official, or if one is attending a trade fair. 
                                                          
471 Brigadier Gopaul ‘Developing mechanisms to control the movement of arms and ammunition in and through the 
sea ports of entry, used by private security agencies to protect vessel’s from piracy and armed robbery at sea’ – 
SAPS Communiqué from the Office of the National Commander: Durban harbour addressed to SAASOA Durban 
Chapter Chairperson, 28 February 2011 (Ref:  3/5/1) annexed to this dissertation marked “B” item 3.  Protection 
Vessels International Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security (unreported) KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban Case 
Number 3390/2011annexed to the replying affidavit of Mark Andrew Wilson (see paragraph 4.6) marked “MAW9”. 
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2. It is unclear whether an application made by a duly appointed South African 
nominee/agent (on behalf of a foreign PMSC) falls within the provisions governing 
resident, as opposed to non-resident, applicants. 
3. There is a lack of clarity on whether applications for an import permit made to the DFO 
on arrival at the port of entry in terms of Regulation 62(4)(c) which require “prior 
approval” by the CFO in terms of Regulation 62(7)(f) are subject to the 21 day rule set 
out in Regulation 62(4)(b).  It was found that there is a distinction between prior approval 
and a permit application submitted to the Registrar or DFO.  However, the SAPS have 
interpreted the 21 day rule to apply to all permit applications from PMSC.  It is suggested 
that should the current legislation remain unchanged, foreign PMSC should consider 
applying for “blanket” prior approval from the Registrar and thereafter submit permit 
applications on an ad hoc basis as and when a team is due to arrive in South Africa.  This 
would enable a PCASP to apply for permits on arrival if documents are submitted 
directly to the Designated Firearms Officer (DFO) at the port of entry. 
Alternatively, by including the specific category of PMSC and PCASP in the Regulations to the 
FCA of persons entitled to permits, the prior approval requirement would not apply and 
applications could proceed as if they were received from a hunter, sports shooter, person 
attending a trade fair or foreign law enforcement official. 
In the researcher’s view, in the interests of its own internal security, South Africa cannot allow 
ex-military personnel to arrive at its ports with semi-automatic weapons and apply for permits 
without sufficient notice, whether or not blanket prior approval has been obtained.  At the same 
time, the 21 day rule is not feasible for the maritime industry.  It was shown in the mv “Roelof” 
case that a transit from Mombasa to Durban can take seven days, making it impossible to comply 
with the 21 day rule.  A compromise is required with input from stakeholders such as the South 
African Association of Ship Operators and Agents (SAASOA), some of whose members 
facilitate weapons permits and logistical arrangements for PCASP. 
The researcher is of the view that South Africa stands to benefit from the opportunity to be a 
suitable hub point for armed guards.  The prevalence of piracy off both the West and East Coasts 
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of Africa positions South Africa as the perfect geographical candidate for the facilitation of 
PCASP.472 
PMSCs have obtained prior authorisation from coastal states like Djibouti, Sri Lanka and 
Mauritius to operate from their ports.473  South Africa should consider adopting policies to 
facilitate and regulate the movement of PCASP in its ports in that “by closely regulating and 
monitoring the operations of PSCs, coastal states can ensure that PSCs maintain the highest 
standards of professionalism and accountability, while at the same time being able to generate 
tax revenue from these companies operations”.474 
If this were to be the case, vessels not scheduled to call at a South African port, would call to 
take on bunkers, crew, cargo, food and stores, generating income for the local economy.  The 
South African government would benefit from the increase in calls by earning extra port revenue 
from vessels.  Security personnel would need to be housed; fed and entertained, which could 
result in further expenditure in the local market.  The economic benefits are manifest if the 
permit process is managed and controlled correctly, taking into consideration South Africa’s 
security and international guidelines. 
Lindiwe Sisulu, the South African Minister of Defence from 2009 to 2012, noted that the 
presence of armed guards on ships was “an international trend” and that “if South Africa was 
going that way (to facilitate armed guards) it will require a drastic restructuring of our own 
regulations and our own laws to accommodate that”.475  She added that South Africa “has not 
                                                          
472 ICC International Maritime Bureau ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report for the period 1 January 
2013 – 31 December 2013. Available on request at www.icc-ccs.org.  See also Prof Theo Neethling ‘Piracy around 
Africa’s West and East coasts: A comparative political perspective’ (2010) 38 (2) Scientia Militaria : South African 
Journal of Military Studies at 94-101. 
473 Mineau M ‘Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Security: The rise of Private Navies in response to Modern Piracy’ 
(2010) Vol. 9 (1) Journal of International Business and Law at 68.  Florquin, N. ‘Escalation at Sea: Somali Piracy 
and Private Security Companies’ in Project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 
‘Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets’: Geneva, Cambridge 2012 at 209-210.  See also Maritime Transport 
Sector (MTS) ‘Information on Port and Coastal State Requirements Related to Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on board Ships’ – November 2012 available at 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/united_nations/imo/imo_egypt_response.pdf accessed 
on 20 August 2014. 
474 Mineau, M. ‘Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Security: The rise of Private Navies in response to Modern 
Piracy’ (2010) Vol. 9 (1) Journal of International Business and Law at 70. 
475 Reported at the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in Cape Town on 11 April 2012 – Dean Wingrin ‘SA ponders 
armed guards aboard merchant ships’ (12 April 2012) – Defence Web available at 
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taken that decision yet”.476  However, the fact is that South Africa has and does issue permits for 
firearms and allows PCASP to disembark in its ports.  While, in the researcher’s view, the 
process and regulations do not specifically cater for these circumstances, the SAPS have made 
concessions to accommodate the entry of PCASP into South Africa.  The admission by the 
former Defence Minister strengthens the researcher’s view that urgent amendments to the FCA 
regulations are required. 
In conclusion, clear conditions are required for weapons permit applications for PCASP on board 
merchant vessels.  The researcher has discussed at length the positive contribution PCASP have 
made to reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia and the potential for a “major environmental 
catastrophe” caused by a vessel under pirate control is further argument that “preventing piracy 
attacks from occurring is the ultimate goal”.477  The researcher recommends amendments to the 
FCA Regulations in Annexure “A” of this dissertation with the intention of remedying the 
shortfalls in the current legislation.  The IMO guidelines or recommendations and flag state 
regulations have been considered in order to streamline the permit process.  This process should 
occur with co-operation between South Africa and other states in order to regulate the private 
maritime security industry and to protect state security by preventing illegal trade in firearms.   
 
5.2 Recommended Amendments to the FCA Regulations 
Annexure A sets out the draft amendments to the FCA Regulations proposed by the researcher.  
The researcher has taken into consideration the IMO guidelines as well as flag and coastal states’ 
policies considered in Chapter Three.  In the definition section of the suggested amendments, 
PMSC and PCASP are defined so as to create a clear category for these specific persons/entities. 
Provision for the South African agent/nominee must be set out in the amendments because of the 
current industry trend as illustrated by the researcher with reference to South African case law.  
The FCA does not provide for an agent to be named as the holder of the permit but this would be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24888:sa-ponders-armed-guards-
aboard-merchant-ships&catid=109:ions&Itemid=238 accessed on 22 November 2013. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Herbig & Fouché ‘Maritime piracy and conservation crime in Africa: Has the die been cast for an environmental 
disaster?’ (2013) 26 (1) Acta Criminologica:  Southern African Journal of Criminology at 45. 
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the most efficient way to obtain an import permit for PCASP.  The agent should also have 
prescribed obligations and responsibilities when named as a holder of an import permit for high 
powered weapons.  The responsible person named on the permit should, in the researcher’s view, 
be in possession of a competency certificate so as to ensure that the vetting process (as if he/she 
were applying for a firearms licence) has run its course.  These provisions are set out in 
Regulation 1 and 62(4)(A)(x) of the suggested amendments. 
The general requirements in Regulation 13 need to be amended to prevent conflict with the 
specific regulation dealing with permit applications, namely, Regulation 62.  There is conflict 
between Regulations 13 and 62 in that the former requires all permit applications to be submitted 
to the registrar at the Central Firearms Registry.  Provision should be made for foreign juristic 
persons registered outside the Republic of South Africa to be included.  Regulation 13 limits 
juristic persons to entities registered or incorporated in South Africa.  This is remedied in the 
suggested amendments in Regulation 13 and in the definition section. 
There should be a clear statement from the SAPS with regard to the permit that the PCASP or 
PMSC should apply for, namely, a multiple import permit, and the documentation required when 
submitting an application.  This would prevent confusion on the definition of “in-transit” and 
“import” as highlighted in Chapter Four.  This is remedied in the suggested amendments in 
Regulation 62(4)(A)(a).   
The researcher proposes in Regulation 62(4)(A)(b) of the suggested amendments that an 
appropriate time to process an application for PCASP would be five business days, thereby 
ensuring a compromise between vessel owners’ sailing schedules and the SAPS requirements to 
process the documentation. 
PCASP should be included in Regulation 62(7) as a specific category of persons entitled to apply 
for an import permit, thereby removing the requirement of “prior approval” from the Registrar at 
the Central Firearms Registry.  This is provided for in Regulation 62(7)(ee) of the suggested 
amendments.  The researcher considered modelling the prior approval requirement in Regulation 
62(7)(f) for PCASP on the Mauritian policy; however, the further requirements listed thereunder 
coupled with uncertainty about the period for which prior approval will be granted does not 
outweigh the effect of including PCASP as a special category along with sports shooters, hunters 
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and persons attending a trade fair.  The researcher has suggested at length that South Africa 
should model its policy on armed guards on that of Mauritius and this can be achieved by 
publishing a communiqué subsequent to the promulgation of the Regulations without affecting 
the nature of the Regulations.  The researcher therefore suggests as an alternative, that the SAPS 
recommend to the industry that PMSC wanting to conduct operations in South Africa should 
submit sufficient documentation in order to allow the authorities to vet and thereafter formulate a 
list of approved PMSC which will enhance the efficient processing of permits as and when they 
are required.  This list should not, however, prevent other PMSCs from applying for permits in 
the normal course of affairs, as this would no doubt be open to challenge, but would operate as a 
list of partially pre-approved applicants, thereby ensuring quicker processing of permits.  The 
researcher is of the view that by making it voluntary and by assuring quicker processing of 
permits for already vetted PMSC, PMSCs will adhere to this recommendation as it will without 
doubt ensure that they are able to provide a more efficient service to their shipowner clients.  
Approved PMSC would also be able to market the fact that they are authorised to operate in 
South African ports and are able to ensure smooth operations and quick turn-around times for 
PCASP teams. 
The multiple import permit should be valid for a minimum of one year so as to reduce the 
workload of the SAPS in processing a multitude of applications as set out in Regulation 62(7)(i) 
of the suggested amendments. 
Cooperation between states is vital and with uniform regulations in place, shipping companies 
will be able to ensure compliance with all laws and regulations applicable to the presence of 





Suggested amendments to the FCA Regulations 
The researcher suggests the following amendments to the Regulations to the Firearms Control 
Act 60 of 2000. 
Explanatory memorandum: 
The surge in pirate attacks off the East and West Coasts of Africa has led to private merchant 
vessels deploying armed security personnel as a means of self-defence. 
Having regard to the specific nature of these personnel and requirements for the embarkation, 
disembarkation, storage and movement of firearms in the Republic of South Africa, the 
legislature is of the view that the current Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 and regulations thereto 
are inadequate for the facilitation thereof in South African territory. 
Taking into consideration the various International Maritime Organisation recommendations 
on armed guards, the legislature found it necessary to amend the Act as it was not drafted with 
this specific category of these personnel in mind. 
The amendments set out hereunder seek to: 
1. Streamline the permit process for privately contracted armed security personnel; 
2. Set conditions for permit holders; 
3. Standardise a format that applicants must follow when submitting an application for a 
firearms permit; 







The amendments are set out as follows: 
Amendments to Regulation (1) – Definitions: 
Regulation 1 is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following: 
“business day” means any day from a Monday to a Friday exclusive of weekends and all public 
holidays.  The business day operating hours shall be from 08h00am to 16h30pm. 
“local agent” means a South African registered company duly incorporated in terms of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 nominated by a local or foreign private maritime security company to 
be their representatives for the purpose of firearms permit applications and arrangements for the 
movement and storage of firearms in the Republic of South Africa. 
“privately contracted armed security personnel” means a person employed by a local or 
foreign private maritime security company to provide armed protection on board any vessel for 
the purposes of defence of the vessel, its crew and cargo against acts of sea piracy and armed 
robbery. 
“private maritime security company” means a local company registered in terms of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 or a foreign company duly registered in terms of the company laws of 
its country that provides armed security services to vessels for the purposes of self-defence 
against acts of sea piracy and armed robbery. 
“responsible person” means a South African citizen employed by a local agent nominated by a 
private maritime security company for the purpose of firearms permit applications and 
arrangements for the vessel and/or privately contracted armed security personnel.  The 
responsible person must be named as the holder of the firearms permit and be in possession of a 
competency certificate issued in terms of Section 9(2) of the Act. 
“sea piracy” consists of any of the following acts: 
124 
 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, 
and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of the facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b). 
 
Amendments to Regulation 13 
Regulation 13(1) is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following after the words “must apply to the Registrar…”: 
“or designated firearms officer”. 
Regulation 13(5) is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following after the words “…Republic of South Africa”: 
“or any other country”. 
 
Amendments to Regulation 62 
Regulation 62(4) is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following: 
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4(A) (a) An applicant who is a Private Maritime Security Company, Privately Armed Security 
Personnel or Master of a vessel may only apply for a multiple import/export permit in the 
prescribed form, namely, SAPS520. 
(b) An application for a multiple import/export permit must be submitted to the 
designated firearms officer at the port of entry at least five (5) business days prior to 
arrival in the territory of the Republic of South African.   
(c) Applications will be accepted on shorter notice in the following circumstances: 
(i) Where a crew member is gravely ill or injured and his immediate disembarkation 
from a vessel is required in a port; 
(ii) Where a vessel is in danger of sinking or requires immediate repairs in a port in 
the Republic of South Africa; or 
(iii) Where for any other reason(s), which shall be submitted in writing with the 
application, good cause has been shown to the satisfaction of the designated 
firearms officer why the permit application cannot be submitted within the 
required five (5) business days and should nevertheless be granted. 
(d) The following documents must be submitted in support of the multiple import/export 
permit application: 
(i) Proof of the vessel’s flag state authorisation to have privately contracted 
armed security personnel and weapons on board; 
(ii) Proof of authorisation from the country where the private maritime security 
company is registered to provide armed protection services on board merchant 
vessels; 
(iii) Proof of the necessary firearms licence in the country of registration; 
(iv) A copy of the firearms export documentation from the country of origin; 
(v) Proof of ownership of the firearms intended to be permitted; 
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(vi) Copies of the passport and police clearance from the country of residence of 
the Master and each member of the Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on board the vessel; 
(vii) Proof of the vessel’s previous and next three (3) ports of call; 
(viii) A statement confirming whether the firearms are to remain on board whilst 
the vessel is in port and confirmation that they are locked in a safe under the 
control of the Master; 
(ix) If the firearms are to be disembarked off the vessel, confirmation from a 
transporter licensed to carry firearms in terms of Chapter 9 of the Act and the 
storage facility that the weapons are to be handled by them and a copy of their 
respective licences; 
(x) A copy of the Responsible Person’s identity document and competency 
certificate; 
(xi) A letter of authorisation from the Private Maritime Security Company 
confirming that the Local Agent is entitled to act on its behalf for the purposes 
of the multiple import/permit application and to facilitate the movement and 
storage of the weapons in the Republic; 
(xii) A copy of the certificate of incorporation of the Private Maritime Security 
Company; 
(xiii) A copy of the vessel’s ship safety certificate; 
(xiv) Proof of insurance and third party liability cover held in favour of the Private 
Maritime Security Company, its local agent and Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel; 
(xv) Proof of authorisation from the vessel’s protection and indemnity insurers that 
the vessel is entitled to carry weapons and to have Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel on board; 
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(xvi) Confirmation that the Private Maritime Security Company has access to legal 
advice from a local firm of attorneys. 
 
Regulation 62(7) is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following category of persons: 
“(ee) to privately contracted armed security personnel employed by a private maritime security 
company”. 
Regulation 62(7)(h)(iv) is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following after the words “…must accompany the holder of the permit” 
“unless that person is a Responsible Person and the weapons are owned by a Private Maritime 
Security Company and in the control of a Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel”. 
 
Regulation 62(7)(i) is amended as follows: 
By insertion of the following after the words “…exceeding 6 months at a time,” 
“except for multiple import permits issued in favour of Private Maritime Security Companies in 
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